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This thesis addresses the role of information communication technologies and the internet in 
explaining modern revolutions. While previous scholarship has analyzed the significance of 
social movements and the potential of citizen actors to cause regime change, it has yet to 
systematically examine the importance of these new technologies for communicating ideology 
and coordinating protest.  By examining four instances of modern political mobilizations (1980 – 
present), this thesis attempts to elucidate the conditions under which modern communications 
technologies play a significant role in the outcomes of political mobilization.  
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Statement of Purpose 
Innovations in information technology have had profound effects in both domestic and 
international politics. These innovations have transformed the manner in which nation-states, 
governments, multinational corporations as well as citizens are able to communicate, transact, 
and socialize. In particular, the spread of internet and mobile communication technologies are re-
shaping the conduct of the much older activities of mass protest and political revolution. This 
thesis examines the impact of new Information Communications Technologies (ICTs) on mass 
political movements. 
Brief Summary of the Literature 
Traditional theories of revolution in political science have stressed role of the state at the 
expense of analyzing the conditions of citizen mobilization. Scholars such as Skocpol (1979) 
have downplayed the potential of civic activism alone to produce political change. In contrast, 
sociologists such as Castells and Bell have explored the salient role that citizens can play in the 
post-industrial, information age when traditional class distinctions have become a less important 
basis for political action. The new ICTs have created a more interconnected world that enables 
citizens to communicate and organize more effectively. Yet the political potential of these ICTs 
is contingent upon citizens’ ability and willingness to make use of these technologies to achieve 
political change.  
 
Hypothesis 
Existing theories of revolution do not take into sufficient account the role of ICTs as well 
as the potential of citizen actors to effect political change from the bottom-up. Drawing both 
upon traditional theories of political revolution as well as sociological analysis of movements 
and technological development, this thesis argues that the adaptation of new ICTs to 
revolutionary situations provides new mobilizational resources to political actors, and can 
empower previously disenfranchised, marginalized citizens.  In particular, ICTs increase both 
internal and external pressures on target regimes as citizens gain the ability to share information 
using alternative modes of communication. However, the availability of such technologies is a 
necessary yet not sufficient condition for successful revolutions. 
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Statement of Research Methodology  
This thesis uses a comparative historical analysis research method to analyze the 
significance of ICTs both in cases of movement success and failure. It employs a paired 
comparison involving two cases in the pre-internet era—one that succeeded, and one that 
failed—and two cases in the post-internet era that experienced similarly divergent outcomes. 
 
Brief Summary of Findings 
In the successful cases of modern political revolution (Philippines 1986 and Ukraine 
2004), the available technologies were utilized to engage the entirety of the respective 
populations to protest existing regimes which, while authoritarian, did not attempt to completely 
suppress civic mobilization. There were very few sectors of the population that the organizing 
opposition failed to mobilize in protest against obvious electoral fraud in both cases. Technology 
was applied in an encompassing fashion in the Philippines by using the power of Radio Veritas 
to reach a population disenchanted with the rule of President Ferdinand Marcos. In the Ukraine 
the existence of the internet along with the creation of social networking forums, most notably 
Maidan, created a political movement that engaged citizens nationwide to pressure the Supreme 
Court to call a new election in the interest of democracy. 
  The failed cases (Tiananmen Square, China 1989 and Myanmar 2007) demonstrated an 
incomplete engagement on the part of the opposition as well as a greater willingness on the part 
of the two governments to use force against their political opponents. The role of ICTs was 
relatively marginal in both cases. In Tiananmen, university students used available technologies 
(student radio, pamphlets, and organizational meetings) that connected to various other campuses 
in China to engage students without reaching different sectors of the Chinese population. In 
Myanmar, while the Saffron Revolution garnered widespread attention from the international 
media and support from transnational civic elites, civic mobilization within Myanmar itself 
remained minimal despite the unpopularity of the regime.  
 
Statement of the Significance of the Findings 
The significance of ICTs for modern political movements is incompletely understood. The 
existence of, and access to, ICTs does not necessarily lead to successful political revolutions or 
regime transition. Rather, it is the application of these technologies by citizens in efforts to 
mobilize and coordinate political movements that can create instances of successful political 
revolution.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
There is a need in the study of comparative politics to examine modern instances of political 
revolution (Thailand 2010, Iran 2009, the colored revolutions 2000-2009) with regard to the role 
played by ICTs. In order to update theories of revolution for the information age, it is necessary 
to examine successful cases of revolution (e.g. Orange) against cases of failed movements. There 
must be a further emphasis on interdisciplinary cooperation between sociology and political 
science. The prevalence of ICTs suggests that there are no longer solely political explanations for 
instances of revolution. Political analysis must embrace the new international informational 
context in order to explain modern events in such a way that takes into account the 
interconnections between politics, economics, and civic mobilization. 
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“Innovations in technology have long been recognized as drivers of social change and the 
dynamics of communication and conflict are central to the processes of change”- Richard 
Solomon (Keynote Addresses from the 1997 Virtual Diplomacy Conference – U.S. Institute of 
Peace) 
CHAPTER ONE: Statement of Thesis 
 
From a comparative historical perspective, revolutionary movements can be seen as 
either social or political in nature. Social revolutions are characterized as swift, fundamental 
transformations of the state and class structure, and are traditionally generated by class-based 
rebellions that seek to overturn existing power relations. In contrast, political revolutions alter 
the state infrastructure, but not necessarily the social structure, and are not necessarily initiated 
by struggle among the classes (Skocpol 1979). Yet this distinction between social and political 
revolutions has been challenged by modern economic and technological developments. The shift 
from industrialization (an industrial/service-based market) to modernization (an information and 
knowledge-based market) has brought about the ability to transform the social and political 
structure of a nation simultaneously by updating the basic elements of communication and 
participation.  
 Although typical political revolutions entail a long evolutionary process of innovation 
and social enhancement, the information revolution has been a rapid transformation that has 
affected nations‟ economic capacities and the citizens‟ ability and willingness to participate. The 
traditional explanation of social class-based revolts which conjectures that an intense 
disequilibrium within society leads to collective political violence has become antiquated. While 
the Marxist philosophy of the distribution of wealth and the dichotomous relationship between 
owner and producer of labor capital still is reflected in most significant revolutions, the class-
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based theory alone is no longer adequate to explain the organization and social mobilization that 
innovations in information technology have made possible.  
The increasing diffusion of information communication technologies (ICTs) has 
transformed the spatial organization of social relations by generating networks of activity. The 
internet creates a twenty-four hour „virtual‟ global community in which governments are less 
able to intervene in individuals‟ participation without disrupting the marketplace, especially the 
flow of goods and information. The catalyst and mainstay of the „globalized‟ world is the 
internet which connects corporations, banking systems, nation-states and individuals to the 
international community in a manner that has profound implications for the future of 
international relations and internal/domestic politics. 
The spread of ICTs poses a challenge to existing explanations of revolutionary change. In 
States and Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol contends “that historically no successful 
revolution has ever been made by a mass-mobilizing, avowedly revolutionary movement” 
(Skocpol 1979: 17). Though widely accepted, her argument does not recognize the revolutionary 
actors beyond the society, state and military. At the time Skocpol wrote, the global society was 
only just beginning to experience the mobilizing effect of ICTs. Yet Skocpol and comparative 
theorists from the waning days of the behavioralist period have contended that no oppositional 
forces, even well-organized and highly inclusive groups (including elites, the majority of the 
population), have ever created a „revolutionary crisis‟ moment successfully exploited for change.  
More recently, comparative theorists have recognized the ability and significance of 
media institutions which have themselves been transformed by ICTs. Only very recently with the 
introduction of blogging and the spread of social networking capabilities in the early 21st century 
have ICTs become a concern of international relations scholarship (see Castells 2006; Cowhey & 
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Aronson 2009; Deibert et al. 2008; Wilson III 2006). However, theorists have on the whole (in 
my research) neglected to focus on the comparative analysis of the use of information 
communication technologies in modern revolutions. The dynamic possibilities that are offered by 
communication of revolutionary ideas via information technology and the effect of these 
innovations on revolutions are the relatively uncharted territory that this thesis intends to address.  
I employ a historical comparative focus to analyze two pairs of revolutions, one occurring 
before the advent of ICTs, the other after their appearance. The People‟s Power Revolution in the 
Philippines (1986) and the student revolt in Tiananmen Square (1989) both occurred prior to the 
emergence of ICTs. The revolutions studied subsequent to the proliferation of ICTs are the 
Orange Revolution in the Ukraine (2004) and the Saffron Revolution in Myanmar (2007). I also 
examine more briefly the use of available communication technologies involved in the Iranian 
revolutions of 1979 and 2009. The People‟s Power Revolution and the Orange Revolution are 
the instances of successful political revolution aided by the available information technologies, 
while Tiananmen Square and the Saffron Revolution failed to achieve political change. In each 
set of case studies, before and after the emergence of ICTs, I will address the following 
questions: In what ways do ICTs empower citizen mobilization in democratic movements, 
particularly in societies with censored or state-controlled media? How does the presence of ICTs 
affect the likelihood of successful revolutions?  
I will argue that the introduction, proliferation and assimilation of advanced technologies 
in the revolutionary situations enhance the ability of political actors to communicate with both 
domestic and international audiences, thus increasing their prospects for successful democratic 
revolutions. In particular, ICTs increase both internal and external pressures on questionable 
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regimes as citizens gain the ability to share information using alternative modes of 
communication.  
However, the availability of such technologies is a necessary yet not sufficient condition 
for successful revolutions. Although it occurred prior to the emergence of ICTs, the Peoples 
Power Movement in the Philippines exploited the communication technology available to 
mobilize a broad spectrum of Filipino society against the regime of Ferdinand Marcos. In 
contrast, the Tiananmen Square uprising failed not because of a lack of technological resources, 
but because student groups were unable to reach out to mass constituencies amongst the workers 
and peasants. While ICTs have subsequently provided new modes of mass mobilization, their 
presence per se does not assure the success of revolutionary movements. In the latter pair, the 
Ukrainian Orange Revolution leveraged the new technologies to overcome authoritarian 
resistance, while the Saffron Revolution failed to break the control of the Burmese military junta 
despite the use of ICTs to mobilize popular resistance. 
The next section discusses the criteria for a modern democratic revolution, contrasting 
new theory with traditional theorists of revolution while synthesizing a contemporary 
explanation of the characteristics for a modern revolution. In the following section I will provide 
a brief synopsis of the four chosen case studies, and then go into detailed explanation of each 
revolutionary case and the actors‟ use of information communication technologies. I conclude by 
addressing the importance of the proliferation and citizen-adoption of ICTs in creating the 
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CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical Framework 
 
Contemporary Interpretation of Revolution Theories: A Review of the Literature 
 
Revolutionary theory is dichotomous in the sense that theorists adopt and emphasize 
either structural (the state) explanations to regime transition or sociological explanations of 
revolution which stress the significance of the political actors who create and affect political 
circumstances. Ironically, there is also a distinct division among technological theorists which 
arguably coincides with that among the revolutionary theorists: technopolitical optimism and 
technological skepticism.  Technopolitical optimism emphasizes the unlimited potential of the 
internet and information communication technology to produce a well-informed, more 
democratic international community which is consistent with sociological, actor-based 
explanations of revolutions. In contrast, technological skepticism stresses the alienating effects 
of new ICTs and generally downplays the potential of the internet to educate, mobilize or create 
democratic change.  
Theorists have attempted to explain the factors that lead to successful political 
transformations. Transitions from an authoritarian state to a democracy depend upon many 
variables, and are not always successful. For example, a prominent scholar, like Phillipe 
Schmitter claimed that the majority Soviet satellite states would fail in successful 
democratization (Schmitter 1974, 2002). Another leading theorist on democratization, Adam 
Przeworski (1986) asserts that the circumstances in which successful democratic movements 
occur do not have an effect on the prospects of long-lasting regime change. Similarly, Skocpol 
(1979) does not regard the polity as a prime mover or sculptor of future policy.  
Traditional revolutionary theorists stress the significance of mass mobilization in 
successful transitions. One widely accepted characterization of a revolution is a “forcible transfer 
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of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make 
incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to 
the state‟s jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc” (Tilly 2007). Most revolutionary 
authors contend that there are typically dueling oppositional blocs that hinder the successful goal 
of regime transformation because it involves great compromise among the opposition about 
„future winners and losers‟ in a developing new society.  
Traditional revolutionary theories neglect the saliency of both agents (the state and 
citizen activists) and their perceptions of the others‟ demands. Structural theories (most visible in 
Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol 1985) emphasize the historical events leading toward 
revolutionary interventions and the actions taken by the state preceding the mobilization of the 
opposition. Citizen activists are largely ignored in structural theory yet amplified to an 
unreasonable level in sociological theories that tend to ignore the role of historical analysis and 
the importance of the state in creating policy or political environments that are unstable and 
poised for democratic transition. In contrast, comparative theorist Fernand Braudel argued that 
revolutions are event-centered which heavily rely upon citizen activists to coordinate protests 
and successfully mobilize to create political transitions (Braudel 1995).  
Historical sociologist Richard Lachmann argues that mass mobilization occurs most often 
during episodes of intense elite conflict where non-elites are able to affect the outcome of the 
elite conflict. Non-elites mobilize when heightened elite conflict creates the opportunities and 
alliances which justify the risks of collective action (Lachmann 1997: 74). The pervasive tenets 
of political elitism have given way to liberal pluralism which encourages participation and 
mobilization in revolutionary movements. In the information age there is a near mandate for 
working class participation along with elite support. On the other hand, the case of Ukraine 
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shows that elite support is unnecessary if the majority of the populace is mobilized effectively. 
Revolutionary actors, especially opposition leaders, invoke and expand classical ideas of justice, 
democracy and equality to mobilize the population, as “idea streams transmitted via the people 
are powerful and pervasive and travel across time and space, people learn, taking into account 
past experience and factoring in new information.” Revolutions are human creations. They are 
the culmination of ideas and political actors in revolutionary processes where some “broad 
sweeps of history are the primary forces” (Selbin 1997: 123, 126).  
Comparative theorist Guillermo O‟Donnell characterizes the opposition as 
“opportunistic” parties who vacillate from willingness to accept any conciliatory offer made by 
the regime to unwillingness to negotiate with the regime at all.  The “moderate” opposition, for 
O‟Donnell, is the key to successful mobilization against the regime. Moderates offer the most 
opportunity for transition toward political democracy because they share a commitment to the 
goal of establishing democracy. If the revolutionary movement is to succeed, the “moderate” 
opposition must become the dominant voice of the dissenters (O‟Donnell 1999: 37). 
The idea of mutually pacified opposition groups is also found in the work of Adam 
Przeworski, who argues that all opposition groups are attempting to replace a particular regime 
and they each represent specific ideological interests and parts of the social spectrum. While the 
opposition is destroying the old regime, it must be simultaneously planning and implementing 
conditions that are favorable to them under a new regime. Due to the coalescence of the 
opposition around a main, commonly accepted goal (typically democratization), the need for 
oppositional consensus about future regime standards is irrelevant until the goal of 
democratization is achieved; essentially varying opposition bloc goals have given way to the 
often passionate and intense demand for democracy in where it is absent (Przeworski 1986).  
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New information technologies pose challenges to both structural and sociological theories 
of revolution. On the one hand, political actors depend on the state for certain infrastructural 
necessities (mobile phone services, internet access, and limited censorship). On the other hand, 
actors use advanced technologies within the politically advantageous circumstance that offer the 
opportunity for democratic transformation. There is a need to explore not only the attitudes and 
ideologies of the citizen actors who create contemporary revolutions, but also the state structures 
that are losing traditional sovereignty in the information age, leaving the state vulnerable to 
transformative collective action. Citizens and the state have both lost autonomy within the 
information age in exchange for increased transparency, accountability, education, efficiency in 
governing and mobilization for various sociopolitically relevant causes. The institutional barriers 
that once existed between government and citizens, and arguably between the classes, have 
blurred, thus are opening windows of opportunity for mass-based political change. In short, the 
increasing salience of new communication technologies means that contemporary revolutionary 
theory must find a way to amalgamate the sociological and structural explanations of regime 
transformation.  
One way of conceptualizing the significance of ICTs is Castells‟ notion of the “network 
society” (Castells 1996). For Castells, the network society is the foundation of social and 
political (domestic and international) relations in the information age, and ascribes new identities 
to citizen actors and social movements. The two types of modern social movements are 
categorized by the type of identity consequently produced via mobilization: resistance identity 
and project identity. Resistance identity describes social movements that are characterized by 
their “resistance to the dominant institutions and the values embodied therein” (Castells 2004; 
Stalder 2006: 86). These movements are initiated and perpetuated by “actors who are in devalued 
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positions and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination” (Castells 2004: 8). Instead of adopting 
and accepting the pre-established societal values, these actors build up resistances to the norms 
and adopt a code of functioning that is completely different from those pervasive in society. The 
most obvious example of resistance groups in the information age is the anti-
globalization/Westernization movement that is prevalent among terrorists and extreme 
nationalists. These actors do not wish to democratically transform or fit into society but fight to 
continue the status quo or institute a more rigid way of life.  
 Project identity describes social movements that are focused on redefining “their 
positions in society, and by doing so, see the transformation of overall social structure” (Castells 
2004: 8). Project identities seek to transform societies in order to find their place within them, 
unlike the resistance identities who wish to preserve their separation from dominant social 
values. Project identities act in order to carve out a path toward integration into existing society 
by changing the norms by which they function. Yet Castells argues that social conflicts are no 
longer products of workplace tension or Marxist class struggle but is cultural conflict and 
understood as a broad set of social institutions including economic (Castells 2006). While 
Castells asserts that the established network society is concerned less with the owners of 
production (bourgeoisie) than with  how humanity can exist in an essentially useful manner, it is 
still necessary to consider the economic and social history of the network society and perhaps the 
process of globalization and ICT diffusion that assist in identity transforming social movements.  
 Sociopolitical movements are a basic aspect of Castells‟ network society theory, which 
emphasizes social transformations arising from the evolution of the internet and proliferation of 
wireless communication technology. As individual network societies have evolved into the 
global network society, antiquated social movements of the pre-information age which typically 
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involved a limited number of political actors (coalitions, nation-states, classes, regimes) have 
given way to movements that are able to “accommodate heterogeneity without fracturing [the 
mobilization effort] and enable previously marginalized cultures to re-affirm themselves. The 
cultural orientation and the reliance on information flows (one-way through the mass media or 
two-way through the internet) connect social movements with the broader cultural 
transformation characterizing the network society” (Stalder 2006: 99).  
I argue that ICTs reduce the need for competing oppositional forces to solicit popular 
support for their version of regime change. Thanks to the use of ICTs opposition groups can 
coalesce against the regime, without having to agree on any specific vision of a post-regime 
environment. O‟Donnell‟s assertion that the success of revolutionary transformations is 
contingent upon the “moderate” opposition‟s ability to manipulate the subsequent opposition 
forces to diminish the role of the mobilized citizenry is particularly useful in the information age 
in which those who possess the ability to organize via new ICTs leads to a more powerful 
majority in the middle instead of relying on extremist opposition groups (O‟Donnell 1999). 
While it is the case that extremist groups are obtaining and utilizing new information 
technologies to communicate a message within their ranks and abroad, the availability of 
resources to the mainstream (middle majority) can compete with the powers that attempt to 
oppress.  
In „new‟ revolutionary circumstances there seems to be a distinct lack of “moderate” 
opposition willing to negotiate concessions to real democratic change. Global citizens who have 
been oppressed or find themselves in a politically advantageous moment are no longer relying on 
a „level-headed‟ center to strike accords with existing regimes. Opposition leaders are mobilizing 
citizens and engaging them in ideological debate, dialogue and potentially action that may be 
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considered „extreme‟ by theorists such as Guillermo O‟Donnell (1999). Castells‟ analysis of the 
two identities that can be fostered within the information age for and against modernization of 
the state emphasizes the role of citizen actors in movements. Castells asserts that the attitudes, 
scope of the movement and potential for success are equal in the information age depending on 
the effective use of the available networks (Castells 2004).  
Oppositional forces have increasingly become an amalgamation of forces opposing the 
status quo. While there are still clear and distinct groups that are more extreme than others in 
their willingness to achieve the stated political goal, the majority of popular modern uprisings 
include participation of all or most of the sectors of society. Successful regime transformations 
have been the product of inclusive mobilization of the populace via the available channels of 
communication and idea-exchange. The new era in revolutions allow the participants to gauge 
the type of opposition group they are joining. The extremist groups are identifiable and are 
deemed as illegitimate actors, making any action they take against existing regimes questionable.  
In the studied cases it became evident that new information technologies have shifted the 
opposition‟s center of gravity to the middle. The availability of resources, including information 
and communication technologies, has been dispersed among the masses instead of being 
concentrated in the hands of the elite or extremists. The centralization of protest has become the 
first step in modern revolutions. The potential for opposition leaders‟ messages to reach further 
than ever before has mobilized the mainstream population armed with various rapid modes of 
communication. The introduction of the network society in the information age has contributed 
to a new manner of explaining social movements and political revolutions that requires analysis 
of types of identity within societies. Castells‟ description of the dichotomy of modern social 
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protest in the context of the network society creates a substantial foundation for new 
revolutionary theory. 
 ‘Network Society’ as the ‘New Civil Society’: Analysis of Modern Technological 
Theory 
 
Often theorists, such as Schmitter & Karl (1991), O‟Donnell (1999), Przeworski (1986), 
argue that the first step toward democratization is the „repoliticization‟ of society. In many 
nations that have experienced successful democratic revolutions, the opposition groups have 
emphasized the reintroduction of politics to the masses as they attempt to mobilize them in 
support of the cause. Throughout the evolution of the internet, research and development efforts 
have introduced a variety of more inclusive forms of ICTs that have established the internet as an 
authoritative communication entity. In particular, innovative new apparatus‟ equipped with 
wireless internet capabilities offer the potential to create a „mobile network society‟. The mobile 
network society stresses the diffusion of “networking logic in all domains of social life by means 
of wireless communication technology” (Castells 2007: 6). The network society creates an 
increased element of sociopolitical inclusivity that allows citizens to discover their interests, 
goals and agendas while coalescing with other similar identities worldwide, sometimes forming 
organizations of collective action (Gimmler 2001).   
The information age and subsequent network society have essentially combined the 
private and public sector into the network society; there is no longer a distinction between 
individuals and the state, but instead a blurred barrier that becomes porous with every new 
technology. Nicholas Negroponte emphasizes the creation of the new civil society and argues 
that the proliferation of ICTs and particularly, the individualization offered in the information 
age extends to the sociopolitical realm which allows citizens to “transcend old social boundaries” 
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(Negroponte 1995: 156). The global proliferation of the internet and its accompanying 
technologies, especially wireless communications are “the material backbone of a global 
interdependence that, of course, was not technologically-driven but technologically-mediated” 
(Castells, 2005: 10). This intensified global interdependence has put increased strain on national 
sovereignty.  
Manuel Castells argues for the emergence of the „global civil society‟ which derives from 
whereby the new communication technologies increase coordination and cooperation among pre-
established civil societies. The “global civil society” is constructed from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), interest groups and global issue activist movements which cultivated the 
“network state” as a proactive mechanism in the international community that spans across 
borders and cultures to create a new international standard. As interdependence (economic, 
political, security) increases, the state attempts to adapt to the new circumstances. Nonetheless, 
“there is a growing gap between the space where the issues are defined (global) and the space 
where the issues are managed (nation-state)” (Castells, 2005: 10). 
This ambiguous space of stalled governance (response to international/domestic crises) 
exacerbates various crises of efficiency, which occur when problems cannot be managed 
properly (global warming, recent global financial breakdowns, or terrorism). These efficiency 
crises are characterized by the growing disconnect among citizens from their nation-state and 
culture which blurs into a further disconnect from the globalized international system of 
government and organization. Instead of the state closing this expanding gap between the 
international (global) civil society and established populations (existing within nation-states), it 
is resisting involvement in the international realm of communication, political and market 
relations.  
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The proliferation of the global civil society will also have network effects which Castells 
describes as the “shared sovereignty, responsibility and flexibility of procedures of governance 
and greater diversity of times and spaces in relations between government and citizens” (2005: 
11). According to Castells, within the framework of the network society, the autonomy of the 
traditional nation-state is diminished because the „global civil society‟ is not necessarily 
concerned with maintaining the modern world system (nation-states). Instead, the network 
society is concerned with filling the holes in governance brought upon by the expansion of the 
globalized world, its technologies and ideologies.  
Although Castells sees the necessity and argues for nation-states to adapt to the global 
civil society and its network qualities, Castells recognizes that the modern nation-state resists 
relinquishing sovereignty. Yet national barriers are almost eliminated by the increased access 
(unhindered) to the internet and the ability to cultivate an identity not related to the State but to 
international causes for justice, peace or other global movements. According to Castells, while 
movements can exist now independently of political institutions and mass media, “it is through 
media politics that non-state actors influence people and foster social change” (2005: 14).  
Yet the construction of the global network society is also replacing the sense of local 
political identity, according to Shaw & Shaw (1999). They argue that the network society is 
making it increasingly difficult for people to identify with those closest to them within their own 
neighborhoods, “as our society becomes more complex, many communities have become less 
cohesive. Frequently, we have lost the sense of the tight-knit neighborhood, of the village, and 
the place where everybody knows each other‟s name” (Shaw & Shaw 1999: 317). Although the 
initial construction of the rise of the network society may erode social and communal relations, 
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the Shaws argue that digital networks can have the potential for rebuilding fragmented 
communities via online social groups, message boards and social networking.  
According to Shaw & Shaw, “neighborhood computer networks can be used to support 
and augment the social infrastructure that is at the core of the cohesiveness in tight-knit 
communities” (1999: 323) which can lead to a more connected society and electorate. The 
message boards employed in the Orange Revolution initiated by Ukrainian citizens in protest of 
fraudulent electoral results are a good example. The large population which is scattered 
throughout the oblasts (provinces) used information technology via the internet to organize mass 
demonstrations in the capital city and surrounding regions. However, effective social 
mobilization and meaningful networking are dependent upon the availability of uncensored, 
unrestricted technologies and the skill to apply ICTs by the citizenry.  
Manuel Castells argues that the obsolescence of the state in the globalized world system 
is overstated, and that the „network society‟ is in fact the post-modern state system. The age of 
globalization is not concerned with stifling wars and disputes over contiguous territories and 
access to ports but is becoming an international movement via the internet for sociopolitical 
justice and representation. The state, as Skocpol was concerned with, does not exist in the same 
manner as it did in the 1980s or even in the 1990s, “the process of global governance is enacted 
in practice by the global network state. The network society in its changing forms of 
representation and articulation is the state of the global age. This state must link the state actors 
with interests in each particular process of governance” (Castells, 15: 2005). While Castells 
recognizes that not all states will accept the globalized world order or “new global democracy”, 
those who reject the new state system “may well become the new form of failed states. The 
political outcasts would not be designated by the superpowers, in terms of their own interests, 
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but stigmatized by the global civil society acting on behalf of the values of humanity” (16: 
2005).  
Theorists in the same vein as Skocpol maintain that the state is not only still relevant but 
is still the cornerstone of international relations in the globalized era. Daniel Drezner updates 
Skocpol‟s thesis and stands in direct opposition to Castells, a well-known „technopolitical 
optimist.‟ Drezner (like Ann McIntosh, Morozov) does not see the internet as a transformative 
mechanism that requires adjustments to the international system of governance. The state, 
according to Drezner, remains the “primary actors for handling the social and political 
externalities created by globalization and the internet” (2004: 478).  
The effect of NGOs (which Castells argues are the prime actors in the globalization age) 
is marginalized because the state, especially modern hegemons have alternative protocol to 
advance their national interests. According to Drezner, “powerful states will use a range of 
foreign policy substitutes, such as coercion and forum-shopping across various international 
institutions to advance their desired preferences into desired outcomes (2004: 478). Clearly the 
separation between Castells and Drezner articulates the division in globalization theory; the first 
is characterized by technopolitical optimism in which the internet proliferation spreads 
international awareness and mobilizes social movements beyond traditional barriers, at the 
expense of traditional state sovereignty (Castells). The second strand adheres to the state system 
that was adopted in the post-World War II era that emphasizes the saliency of the established 
political and social institutions in governance (Drezner, Skocpol).  
The global network society changes nations into networked strategic actors as opposed to 
the sovereign states that existed in the pre-information age. The internet creates a “seamless 
global economic zone, borderless and unregulatable, the internet calls into question the very idea 
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of the nation-state” (Barlow 1996: 76). For Drezner and other technoskeptics, the internet is a 
controllable mechanism that can conform to state regulation and national technological policies. 
However, technopolitical optimists maintain that the global civil society is being established via 
the intense proliferation and adoption of internet and ICTs.  
Castells breaks from new idealistic theories of the media in the information age, theorists 
such as Chadwick, Hansen and Gimmler argue that the internet has increased interconnectedness 
between media, economic, political and sociological actors. For Castells, the “new pattern of 
interaction between media and the state is characterized by the tension between globalization and 
identification” (Castells 2004: 319). The tension is exacerbated by the availability and openness 
offered by the internet which is largely beyond state control. The internet produces major 
problems for states: if states do not allow their citizens access to the internet or restrict their 
ability to use it, states risk losing economic development opportunities. The second issue is most 
worrisome for authoritarian states: allowing the free flow of the internet abdicates control over 
what citizens are producing and taking in online (Stalder 2006).  
The recent struggle between international internet service providers (ISPs) and national 
governments (China) on censorship on web providers has solidified the amalgamation of public 
and private sectors and international and national sovereignty. Authoritarian governments such 
as China, Iran and Cuba who want to assert absolute control over their populations have adopted 
stringent technological policies that restrict available information; “governments have discovered 
that by pressuring ISPs, they can exercise significant control over access to content” (Drezner 
2004: 488). Government attempts to control internet access and internet-filtering have 
proliferated in authoritarian states and have put increased pressure on ISPs (the majority of 
which are Western) to respect national sovereignty while consciously disregarding basic 
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democratic rights. These authoritarian governments act to censor and control citizens while 
simultaneously reaping the benefits from participation in the global market economy. These 
governments want to “exploit the internet‟s commercial opportunities while restricting the use of 
the internet for political criticism” (Drezner 2004: 488).  
The question in the information age seems to be moving away from whether or not the 
state is losing sovereignty and towards the question of how multinational corporations (MNCs), 
NGOs and ISPs reconcile authority within the national framework so that the state remains the 
authority. A modern example occurred in 2002 when Chinese officials were successful in 
persuading over three hundred internet service providers and web engines including Yahoo! to 
voluntarily sign a pledge refraining from “producing, posting or disseminating pernicious 
information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability” (Bodeen 2002).  
Modern technological theorists such as Evgeny Morozov (2010) have grown skeptical of 
the unifying and democratizing promises of the internet age. At first, the internet encouraged 
technopolitical optimism. Theorists and technological advocates alike touted the democratizing, 
leveling and unifying potentials that the information age offered to global citizens.  In The Death 
of Distance, Frances Cairncross prophesized that the information revolution would “increase 
understanding, foster tolerance and ultimately promote worldwide peace” simply by existing and 
proliferating throughout the global society (1997: xvi). Yet Morozov (2010) argues that the 
internet has done little or nothing to enhance global awareness and interconnectivity. In fact, 
according to Morozov, the internet has resulted in heightened nationalism and restrictive political 
measures adopted by governments like China and Iran, to control technological proliferation and 
respond with subsequent policy. The concept of “information sovereignty” has improved upon 
classical arguments of border security and national autonomy, as the proliferation of internet 
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technologies increases the susceptibility of global citizens to new (predominately Western) 
forums of information and knowledge-sharing.  
Many governments are concerned that the dominance of internet technologies by 
American corporations will introduce the American value system and thoughts into their 
societies. The information revolution has tested the traditionally accepted concepts of 
international relations such as sovereignty and autonomy. The porous nature of the internet 
allows users and subsequently, internet service providers to circumvent the ascribed 
technological policies of the host/operating nation and provide citizens with information often to 
the chagrin of authoritarian leaders who wish to manipulate and create public knowledge. The 
rise of national technology policy and the creation of nationalized internet service providers is 
seemingly inevitable (Castells 2005, 2007).  
I am proposing an addendum to revolutionary theory that attempts to modernize 
explanations of mobilization in contemporary movements which involves the centralization of 
opposition protest toward the mainstream that includes a wider population of actors as opposed 
to reliance upon the state for political change.  The success of democratic revolutions using 
information technology as a mobilization resource and the modern social movement emphasized 
by the network society theory of Castells‟ stands in contrast to his continued advocacy of the 
state as “primary locus of power, defined by its exclusive control over the means of violence 
within a given territory” (Stalder 2006: 104). Castells centers his analysis of power and social 
movements on the state and while he argues that nation-state theory and traditional sources of 
power are shifting from existing institutions, he does not give much detail on new sources of 
power that arise in the network society. Yet I argue power sources are not only arising from the 
well-informed, mobilized (global) citizenry, but also from the simultaneous deterioration of 
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national sovereignty because of rise of ISPs which has foster increased interdependency among 
NGOs and MNCs has also contributed to the decline in authority that the state possesses.  
Skeptics of the efficacy and impact of the information revolution on political 
mobilization argue that scholars tend not to address the self-mobilizing citizens who organize 
collective action without the aid of the mass media. Dissenting theorists such as Michael T. 
Greven contend that technological determinists naively prophesize the deterioration of traditional 
institutions of the mass media and its replacement with the global network society which creates 
a public sphere poised for action (Greven 1995). Leo Marx (1999) argues that the impact of 
information communication technologies and the internet is diminished because of the lack of 
“internet literacy” (99). Marx believes that computer technology is limited to those within the 
population who possess a degree of education, literacy and the ability to understand its potential 
which is not present within the minority and working classes. The complex nature of the internet 
and its accompanying technologies prevent it from being a “widely unifying or transformative in 
disadvantaged communities” (Marx 1999: 134).  This line of reasoning ignores institutionalized 
barriers that impede genuine political discussion to the point that even the highly networked 
citizen cannot hope to penetrate the status quo.  
However, cyberspace is providing marginalized portions of the political community with 
a new forum to coalesce and mobilize (e-mobilization) for change, whether in protest or to 
spread ideology. According to Gimmler, “the plurality of the public sphere is no longer an 
unwelcome fact which must be accommodated but instead a diversity to be welcomed” (2001: 
28).  In the pre-internet (before 1995) global society, advancements and adoptions of new modes 
of communication were partially contingent upon a nation‟s willingness/tendency to embrace 
democracy and inherently, capitalism. Citizens are dependent upon journalists and media outlets 
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for information that may or may not be state-sponsored, controlled or biased. Authoritarian 
regimes rely upon state-controlled media outlets to propagandize and to legitimize their rule to 
an oppressed population.  
This reliance on the media adds to the personalization of identity politics which via media 
messages helps to mobilize various causes in an online forum and gives voices to diverse, 
fragmented political actors. In the industrialized nations, arguably more opportunity of access is 
offered and “there is a fundamental qualitative shift in the politics of Western nations, it is clear 
that the internet reduces the levels of expertise and professional knowledge required for the 
production of cultural forms of political appeal, narrowing the gap between oppositional voices 
and the institutionally-produced messages of powerful groups” (Chadwick 2006: 31). Wireless 
communications considerably increase the information and communication power of the people, 
making them more independent of the formal institutions of information (print and traditional 
broadcast).   
Castells (1996, 2005) points to the loss of national control over the media as a direct 
contributor to the decline in authority of the state, in particular by the citizen activists who use 
new technology to facilitate communication beyond state control. Castells breaks from what I 
would consider the trajectory of modern revolutionary theory in his discussion of how the 
„narrowcasting‟ news media should act in the information age. Castells argues that in order for 
media outlets to survive the competition, they must attract viewers that are a much broader 
portion of the population to compete in the market and attract advertisers (Stalder 2006). Castells 
also warns the media outlets not to become closely associated with partisan politics or specific 
political positions to continue reaching the broadest segment of the population.  
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However, in the age of cable television, narrowly casted news channels, information, 
sitcoms and reality television provide economic incentives for media outlets (particularly in the 
form of advertising) and also help legitimize the status quo. Media outlets have diversified and 
the niche channels have become the engine of popular political protest and outrage (Fox, 
MSNBC) and the reaction of advertisers is essentially the same as in the pre-information age. 
While it is riskier to be affiliated with the gadflies and often the network society witnesses pop 
culture figures hit with drops in advertising after controversial events, media outlets, instead of 
becoming non-partial beacons of professionalism, have embraced and in many ways exacerbated 
the factions in politics.  
 It is through the resurrection of the civil society (particularly political society: the 
electorate, citizen activists) and the engineering of the network society that transitional regimes 
meet their greatest contemporary challenge, the “revived identities and capacity for collective 
action of working, low-ranking unionized workers” (Foran 1997: 102). According to Castells, 
“ultimately the power of the global civil society acting on public opinion via the media may 
overcome the resistance of state apparatuses to limit their power in exchange for increasing their 
legitimacy and, ultimately their efficiency” (2005: 12). Yet authoritarian nations such as China 
and Iran maintain that their sovereignty is violated by multinational internet service providers 
who do not adhere to the national technological and information policies, often internet content 
filtering or the complete obstruction of certain websites.  
There has been a popular pattern in the global civil society within revolutionary 
movements that provides for the coalescence of associations, trade unions, religious groups, 
community organizations along with elites to form the aggregate known as „the people,‟ as 
opposed to the typically factionalized class-based rebellions of the pre-internet era. In the 
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information age citizen-actors are able to create revolutionary movements and mobilize via the 
internet, while advanced technologies allow supporters to receive information immediately and 
mobilize at a rapid pace.   
 
Technology and Democratic Theory 
 
Transformation from authoritarian regimes toward more democratic governance is 
historically known as a methodical process that requires national economic efforts in 
development as well as increases in education (Przeworski 1986). The new information 
technologies enhance the ability of bottom-up, grassroots movements to demand adherence to 
democratic ideals and to establish institutions that favor citizens over government officials. 
Contemporary movements for democratization, most recently the various „colored‟ revolutions, 
have embraced the urgency of political reform during advantageous sociopolitical circumstances 
without the necessity of violence on the part of both the state and the political activists. Although 
this new wave of non-violent yet successful transformative revolutions that have accompanied 
the information age most often stand in contrast to traditional revolutionary theories, “transitions 
can also develop into widespread, violent confrontations, eventually giving way to revolutionary 
regimes which promote changes going far beyond the political realm” (Schmitter & O‟Donnell 
1986: 3) which has proven to be true in the latter revolutions of this decade (Thailand, 
Kyrgyzstan). 
Adam Przeworski describes the conditions of authoritarian regime and the open 
opportunity structure that allows opposition movements to succeed at democratic change. The 
condition most relevant to the case studies analyzed in this thesis is the loss of political 
legitimacy. In order for authoritative regimes to survive there must be some sort of societal 
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acceptance of the regime as a legitimate political actor that is protecting society in some manner. 
Once the legitimacy barrier has been lost it is no longer necessary for the regime to exist. This 
new legitimacy also creates an opportunity for the opposition to demand that the regime act in 
accordance with its democratic interests (Przeworski 1986).  
Often when authoritarian regime leaders begin to fear the breakdown of their legitimate 
authority, they begin a process of liberalization to impede democratization and as “liberalization 
advances so does the strength of demands for democracy (Schmitter & O‟Donnell 1986: 10). In 
our two examples of successful revolutionary democratic transitions (Ukraine and Philippines), 
the loss of authoritarian legitimacy was signaled to the public by the existing regime in policy 
concessions that moved away from the regime‟s stated agenda. The shift from strict martial law 
in the Philippines to a more free press in the latter years of the Marcos regime signaled to the 
population that the regime was willing to make partial democratic concessions in order to 
maintain their power and legitimacy. Yet the incremental moves toward a more democratic 
society only ignited the people‟s desire to replace the existing regime. 
The loss of legitimacy equates to the deterioration of public trust in the regime and “may 
indeed constitute a persuasive signal [of opportunity for opposition] if this loss consists of more 
than a change of the individual states of mind and is manifested in a clear message that 
something will have to be done” (Przeworski 1986: 55). In the case of the Ukraine, it was not the 
existing regime that offered the democratic „window of opportunity‟ but the judicial institutions 
that declared the need for a new election in the name of electoral justice. 
Although the loss of legitimacy could act as the deciding factor for the opposition as to 
whether or not the political circumstances are favorable toward regime change, Przeworski 
maintains that the “objective factors” constitute constraints such as is possible under a concrete 
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historical situation, but do not determine the outcome of such (revolutionary) situations 
(Przeworksi 1986). Even in the information age the “objective factors” (fraudulent electoral 
turnouts, intense economic downturn due to governmental corruption, long-standing 
sociopolitical oppression) are essential for creating the revolutionary environment. Providing that 
the citizenry is mobilized and coordinated properly, the “objective factors” can and in cases like 
Ukraine (2004), the Philippines (1986), Kyrgyzstan (2005) and various other revolutionary 
examples, do determine the outcome and in cases such as Moldova (2008) not always 
democratically. Nonetheless, the existence and availability of ICTs creates an expanded political 
opportunity structure that enhances the ability of the opposition to espouse ideology and put 
pressure (including international allies) on „bad‟ regimes. 
 New ICTs are the foundation of global network societies. New technological modes and 
systems are important in our daily lives. Consciously or unconsciously, societies are choosing to 
build infrastructure that supports technologies that influence how people are going to work, 
communicate and consume. Nations willing to allow capitalism to destroy inefficient companies 
and to use the information revolution to replace ineffective modes of communication, will also 
invest in new innovations. The nations that “rely on their governments to protect them from such 
creative destruction will fall behind in the era” (Friedman 2000: 11).   
Democracies require on-going dialogue over policy and opinion to foster a healthy, 
legitimate government. The invention and diffusion of new ICTs creates more opportunities for 
citizens to be mobilized so they can participate and create a meaningful relationship with the 
government. Although these technologies offer more opportunities for the population to become 
politically aware, many theorists believe that the selectivity of the internet allows its users to 
bypass information that does not pique their interest. According to Gimmler, “modern 
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democratic theory has been preoccupied with the principle of publicity in the realm of law or the 
state, and with the participation of citizens in the process of discussion and decision-making” 
(2001: 22). The internet alone cannot educate a citizen actor; the citizen must be an active 
participant in the search for knowledge whether engaging in an online discussion, watching the 
current local and international news, or mobilizing mass demonstrations for regime change. 
Governments everywhere have recognized the importance of the internet in effectively 
communicating goals to their constituents. Chadwick characterizes “the concept of e-democracy 
as associated with efforts to broaden political participation by enabling citizens to connect with 
one another and their government via new information communication technologies” (2006: 84). 
The political opportunity structure available to citizens is measured by the form of government 
that represents their interests. Sociological theorist van der Heijden argues that “the more 
decentralized a state system is, the more balanced the power relations among legislative, 
executive and judiciary are, the more proportional the electoral system is, and finally, the more 
available the instrument of referendum is, the larger the number of points of access for new 
social movements.” The latter points fit the cases of the People‟s Power and Orange Revolutions 
(van der Heijden 2006: 31).  
 E-democracy offers the public complete autonomy from national authority to build social 
capital which can be turned into effective political dialogue. The information revolution 
encourages the strengthening of the populace in educational terms. The public must be informed 
in a „network democracy.‟ As Rahman states, “the ideological urges of enlightened popular 
forces are clearly for a meaningful form of democracy that gives effective power to the people 
rather than to local, national and international elite groups to guide the course of society and the 
world” (2004: 20). Nation-states must not only adopt and foster new technological innovation 
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and education, but also adopt capitalist economic policies. Authoritarian regimes, particularly 
post-World War II, that were using the promise of economic growth to legitimize their 
oppressive rule have been exposed in the information-free market era (Friedman 2000).   
Global theorists emphasize the connecting and leveling effect that the information 
revolution has had on world development. However, in practice the information age can only be 
accessed by nations that can afford to compete. The gap between „have‟ and „have not societies 
is created by the costs of producing and diffusing information. Information requires great 
investment in intelligence and publication/broadcast infrastructure. Nations that cannot afford or 
are not willing to engage their citizenry with a “plentitude of information” are now seen as 
repressive and less able to compete in a meaningful way in the global market (Nye & Keohane, 
2004: 88).  
 The users of new communication processes enhance the autonomy of individual citizens 
by utilizing wireless modes. The user of wireless ICTs can control the diffusion of information 
and the message itself. Castells describes the concept of “safe autonomy” in which new 
information communication technologies essentially insulate the individual from outside 
judgment or bodily harm. According to Castells, “mobile communication facilitates a 
combination of autonomy and safety by making individuals free to relate to the world while 
relying on his or her infrastructure of personal support” (2007: 248). At the same time nations, 
economies, and governments have become interdependent upon the technologies that connect 
them to each other and maintain their ability to structure business. Interdependence is 
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or political actors in different nations. This is 
often the result of international transactions which are now virtual and essentially costless to 
transmit crucial information across boundaries.  
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As a result, the independence associated with the traditional nation-state is being replaced 
by the era of transnational actors, such as multinational corporations, transnational social 
movements and international organizations that have overshadowed the state‟s authority. The 
information revolution has altered the dependency pattern that a state may have fostered prior to 
the adoption of new ICTs and telecommunication policies. The democratic state has an 
advantage in the information age due to the inherent principles of democratic ideology, such as 
the free exchange of information, accountability, and transparency in government transactions. 
Protesting has returned to an acceptable place in political participation, and has thus reinstituted 
a sense of communal place in which “demonstrations can be seen as another way in which 
people can connect to public life; the social ties forged in country associations and unions create 
the social networks and bonds that may also encourage people to participate in democracies” 
(Norris 2005: 200).  
Theorists like Ann McIntosh doubt the democratic potential of new ICTs to engage 
citizens, stating that there is “nothing democratic about technology” (McIntosh 2001: 2). In fact, 
the information revolution has separated citizens into education levels: those who are able to 
exploit information and those who cannot. Thus information (network) democracies may 
empower minority elites. Citizens who are able to utilize legislative and parliamentary bill 
text/tracking systems and process debate transcripts are more likely to use their knowledge to 
influence the powers that be (Kampen & Snijkers: 2003).  
Although McIntosh downplays the democratic potential of the internet, there are many 
democratic ideals and features attached to the users of technology and the internet. Those citizen 
activists who can coordinate ideology, disseminate information and organize protests have the 
potential to create campaigns for democracy, place demands on their governments and increase 
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international pressure on illegitimate authoritarian regimes. The information age advances the 
ability of citizens to make political change from the bottom-up as opposed to waiting for change 
from the top-down. In the information age, the “human actors are not simply the corners of 
structures but also the generators of them” (Selbin 1997: 124).  
However, most global theorists maintain that the information revolution has manifested a 
modern view of political participation that involves the government increasing its transparency 
which in turn leads to greater public awareness. Globalization has fostered a knowledge-based 
market economy requiring nations to encourage the technological education of their citizens. The 
development and general accessibility of internet technology and its innovations acts as a new 
mode for communication and the rapid speed at which it can diffuse information and ideology 
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CHAPTER THREE: Case Study Explanation 
 
Comparative historical analysis is a predominately qualitative research approach that 
emphasizes the juxtaposition of two or more “historical trajectories” of nations, institutions or 
civilizations (Skocpol 1979: 36). It is appropriate to apply comparative historical analysis to the 
events leading to revolutionary movements. Exploring the recent history (previous 10-20 years) 
of a state and its society can reveal the policies and regime factors that are relevant to explaining 
the impending revolution. Due to the relatively recent proliferation of our independent variable 
of interest (ICTs), it is necessary to compare the equivalent media outlets and technologies from 
the pre-information revolution age: radio, alternative newspapers, university press associations or 
structured state media institutions.  
This thesis adopts Ted Gurr‟s definition of „political violence‟ from his theoretical work 
Why Men Rebel. Political violence is defined as “all collective attacks within a political 
community against the political regime, its actors – including competing political groups as well 
as incumbents or its policies. The concept represents a set of events, a common property of 
which is the actual or threatened use of violence…the concept subsumes revolution…it also 
includes guerilla warfare, coups d‟état, rebellions and riots” (Gurr 1970: 3). Although half of the 
case studies are not necessarily violent revolutions, they do all involve a certain degree of 
coercion by the government via well-organized acts of political mobilization and dissent.  
The use of comparative historical method can also illuminate the role of ICTs in 
democratic movements. The history of the national media and the traditional modes of 
information dissemination must be viewed using comparative analysis, in order to judge the 
progression of the national media institutions into the information age. An information-deficient 
society will perhaps be more likely to exploit alternative routes to receiving news and ideology.  
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This thesis argues that the preexisting democratic institutions in a nation affect its 
willingness and ability to adopt new information technologies, giving the citizens opportunity to 
utilize ICTs in political participation and mobilization efforts. In the years before the information 
revolution, news and information dissemination was contingent upon institutions that were 
beyond the scope of citizen‟s control. Activists relied upon structured communication devices 
like radio, pamphlets, audio cassettes and communal gatherings to engage others in protest. The 
focus in the pre-internet age will be on the failed political revolution in China‟s Tiananmen 
Square and on the successful ousting of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos.  
The People‟s Power Revolution occurred in 1986. However, there was much political 
turmoil and transition that began to brew in the Philippines beginning in the early 1980s. 
President Ferdinand Marcos instituted a series of economic reforms that affected not only the 
peasant-class but the elites as well. Aided by Radio Vertias, mobilization against Marcos was 
swift and all-encompassing, ranging from the rural areas to the country‟s urban economic 
centers. The People‟s Power Revolution was a successful example of a population using the 
available communication technologies in advantageous political circumstances to force change.  
The failed student revolution at Tiananmen Square, China in 1989 emphasizes the need to 
have a more prominent portion of the population mobilized against the status quo or at least in 
favor of the attempted reforms. The majority of the population, including the peasant-working 
class in China at the time of the Tiananmen revolt, was economically stable and disinclined to 
pressure the CCP. A major difference in the case of China and in Myanmar is that those 
revolutions did not occur under electoral circumstances; both cases involved failed protests 
against existing rule because of economic (in the case of the students, future economic) reforms 
that negatively impacted the people for government gains.  
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In both revolutionary cases, the political actors used the resources available to them in 
attempt to mobilize and overthrow existing regimes in their respective nations. It is crucial to the 
study to recognize the significant difference between the Philippines in the 1986 People‟s Power 
Revolution and China in the 1989 revolt at Tiananmen. While both nations were authoritarian by 
Western standards, the Philippines had embraced far more democratic institutions by the mid-
1980s, allowing its citizens to effectively utilize broadcast television and radio to successfully 
overthrow a repressive government. However, the lack of resources and the intense restriction on 
the flow of information in China led to the relatively swift extinguishing of the student-worker 
dominated protests in the streets.  
New information technologies have altered older patterns of citizen mobilization. Yet 
their effect on the successful political change or democratization has not been examined in a 
systematic way. While there are obvious correlations between democratic tendencies in nations 
and their adoption of technology, it is the extent to which their citizens are able to use ICTs that 
empowers them politically. The information era is just beginning to unfold and the new forms of 
technology that are vital to networked communication have only started to peak. As scientists 
and engineers study internet technologies, they develop more personalized, effective tools of 
communication and social organization, i.e. the expansion of the social communal network and 
its availability on any mobile communication technological device. 
 The post-information age revolutions that are analyzed begin with the successful Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine (2004). The „colored revolutions‟ are characterized by the pattern of non-
violent revolutionary popular uprisings predominately occurring in the Soviet satellite nations, 
many of which (2004 to present) relied upon internet and mobile communication technology to 
express disapproval of the fraudulent elections. The Orange Revolution was a direct result of an 
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intensely divided electorate and ideology of the candidates, Russia-endorsed President Viktor 
Yanukovych and Western-oriented challenger Viktor Yushchenko. When the news of electoral 
fraud leaked to the population, millions of Ukrainians began constructing online forums, blogs 
and message boards that organized citizen protests over a period of weeks for democratic 
electoral reform. This resulted in the replacement of Yanukovych by Viktor Yushchenko. New 
ICTs were not only pivotal in efforts to organize and activate citizens, but also in terms of 
rallying international support for the replacement of a non-democratically elected official.  
 The most recent revolution is the on-going violence in the nation of Myanmar (formerly 
Burma). The military junta that took control of the nation in 1962 instituted a stringent model of 
socialism and nationalized private industry while maintaining strict control over trade (Head 
2007). The Saffron Revolution began in direct response to a dramatic increase in commodity 
taxes, and the removal of subsidies on gasoline. The economic pain inflicted by these reforms 
prompted a wave of protests in the streets, to which the junta responded forcefully. While more 
recent revolutionary episodes have proven equally or more violent than the Saffron Revolution 
(Thailand, Kyrgyzstan), it certainly evoked international outrage.  
The Saffron Revolution of 2007 quickly achieved global notoriety because of mass 
celebrity and political responses to the public beating and murder of peaceful protesters, 
including a large portion of the Burmese religious community. The most notable international 
response was the address given by President George Bush in September 2007 at the United 
Nations, which caused the Myanmar delegation to walk out during his speech. The protest was 
led by local Buddhist monks who elevated the issue due to the obviously peaceful resistance and 
nature of Buddhism. Although there was intense diffusion of background information and 
corresponding global outcry, the Saffron Revolution failed to achieve regime or economic policy 
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changes that were sought by the people. Although the effects of mass mobilization via the 
broadcast media are relatively inconsistent given the national circumstances, mass media outlets 
played a significant role in initiating global action, predominately in the form of pressing 
governments to respond to and renounce humanitarian injustices, but did not place sufficient 
pressure on the junta in Myanmar.  
 In each case, the availability of information, freedom of the press and limitations on 
citizen access to ICTs all have an impact on the role information technologies play in 
democratization. While I argue that the existing democratic institutions and tendencies of a 
nation greatly affect its ability and willingness to subscribe to the information revolution, it is the 
role of the citizenry and their utilization of new modes of communication that can transform a 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Pre-Information Revolution Case Studies 
 
 The proliferation of ICTs within the international community has created the opportunity 
for more educated citizens and transparent governments. If allowed, the benefit of globalization 
and the network society it fosters have the potential to establish sustainable democratic 
institutions. In the pre-information revolution there was an abundance of technologies available 
that led to the creation of a revolutionary environment if accessed and coordinated effectively by 
opposition leaders.  
 In the study of contemporary (latter 20th century) revolutions a common theme appears; 
there is a correlation between the successful establishment of democratic institutions via socio-
political uprising and the accessibility of modern communication technologies. This is even 
present in the pre-internet revolution period where political actors were bound by conventional 
media (radio, television, newspaper) to capitalize on or to create effective political movements. 
The most successful example of political actors harnessing the power of the available 
communication technologies in the pre-information revolution age is the Philippine People‟s 
Power Revolution, which capitalized on a crumbling regime and a Catholic-owned broadcast 
radio station to organize a swift and orderly disposal of the Marcos regime.   
 
The Power of the People: Marcos’ Timeline to the People’s Power Revolution 
 
 The Philippines has a turbulent history marked by American interference in its domestic 
politics. Although the foundation of the Philippine democracy was shallow, the people were 
eventually able to recognize the oppression and lack of sound leadership within the Marcos 
administration. Until the declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972, the 
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Philippines had been regarded as the most democratic of the ASEAN (Association of South East 
Asian Nations) members. Among the notable democratic institutions was a widely revered free 
press. The declaration of martial law or Proclamation 1081 was justified as the precursor to the 
“New Society” that Marcos was attempting to construct. 
 The progression of Marco‟s regime coincided with the expansion of the global free 
market which caused multiple crises within the nation due to the corruption present within the 
Philippine democratic institutions. Marcos quickly began a campaign of reform, in particular 
land reform for the peasant farmers who were sustaining the nation‟s export economy. Although 
Marcos, who was first elected in 1965, established symbolic programs that were intended to 
assist farmers and landowners, by the mid-1970s reform had proven to be ineffective and 
development stagnated. While the Ministry of Agrarian Reform announced that growing 
numbers of Certificates of Land Transfer were being issued it failed to mention that after 
issuance, they were stored in a safe at the Ministry instead of being given to tenants (Overholt 
1986: 1143). Marcos and the Congress of landlords denied the majority of the population the 
ability to own the land that they worked.  
 The Marcos administration‟s economic policies focused on capital-intensive sectors of 
production, such as nuclear power, steel and copper, during the period of martial law, ostensibly 
to bring about the “New Society” (Overholt 1986).  The emphasis Marcos placed upon 
knowledge-based economic sectors was extremely limited, as most of the nation‟s workers were 
unskilled. The monopolization of the Philippine industries by Marcos and his cronies, especially 
the agricultural sector kept unemployment rates high, undermined the middle class and put great 
strain on the farmers.  
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Global market pressures encouraged these exploitative economic policies, as many 
peasants were displaced from their land in order to make room for additional money-producing 
export crops. While the rapid expansion of agricultural exports positioned the Philippines to 
profit from the boom in commodity prices, the increase in revenue was not distributed evenly 
within the Filipino society. Estimates by the Philippine Commission for Good Government of the 
amount of money that Marcos illegally acquired and moved abroad ranged up to ten billion 
dollars (U.S.) (Hawes 1990: 275).  
Essentially, the Marcos regime systematically destroyed the nation‟s economic 
entrepreneurial spirit and ability to compete in the international market. Marcos disabled national 
economic institutions; “by turning them into instruments of patronage, he [Marcos] deprived the 
Philippine society of its skeleton” (Overholt 1986: 1149). The 1981 crisis in the Philippines was 
a direct result of the self-interested economic policies enforced by Marcos. The collapse of the 
coconut oil market, for example, affected 16 million Filipinos, one-third of the nation. The 
National Coconut Authority raised prices drastically after determining that the Philippines owned 
60 percent of the world‟s coconut oil market. Marcos issued decrees that forced international 
conglomerates out of the coconut oil market, where they were paying world market prices for the 
coconut produce. Simultaneously, Marcos was encouraging a takeover of the coconut oil market 
and crops by legislating a monopoly run by cronies who paid half the market price to the nation‟s 
farmers. When the coconut oil market collapsed in the Philippines, the peasant class began to 
form coalitions with opposition forces. The revolution was brewing.  
The lack of economic leadership was accompanied by Marcos‟ complete disregard for the  
„common good‟ or the protection of citizens. The Marcos administration stretched the 
preexisting constitution and led multiple constitutional „conventions,‟ the first being prompted by 
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his impending term limitation which was justified rhetorically by nationalist arguments for 
altering the American-imposed constitution. However, the convention actually delayed the 
interim/transitional period between the old constitutional powers of the president and the new 
powers of the prime minister (Youngblood 1981; Overholt 1986).     
The Marcos Declaration of Martial Law  
 
Using the justification of imminent Communist guerilla warfare, the president declared 
martial law in 1972 after a series of government-coordinated attacks on the government itself to 
create a perceived threat of chaos and legitimize his declaration. While the Filipino people knew 
that Marcos exaggerated the intensity of the communist threat, a majority of the citizens initially 
supported the authoritarian takeover of the Philippine society (Youngblood 1981). The United 
States remained neutral on the declaration, believing that an unfettered Marcos would institute 
some necessary social and economic reforms that the more democratic government which 
preceded him failed to implement. Under martial law, Marcos implemented reforms that 
improved public security at the cost of civil liberties. These measures included prohibiting 
demonstrations against the government, severely limiting the ability of the Philippine mass 
media to disseminate accurate information and seizing weapons from common citizens (Hawes 
1990).  
When he declared martial law, President Marcos took complete control of the Filipino 
mass media and arrested popular dissenting journalists and publishers. In his Letter of Authority 
No. 1,  Marcos ordered the press secretary and the Secretary of the Department of National 
Defense to “jointly take over and control all such newspapers, magazines, radio and television 
facilities and all other mediums of communication wherever they are, for the duration of the 
present national emergency” (Youngblood 1981: 712). Marcos ceased publication of fifteen of 
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the sixteen Manila newspapers and allowed only the Voice of the Philippines and the Far East 
Broadcasting Company to operate.  
The president dismantled the American press model that was established during 
American occupation. The press in the Philippines had been regarded as among the most free in 
Asia until the introduction of martial law and the suppression of the Filipino media. Marcos 
justified his domination of the media by insisting that the Filipino media had experienced a 
communist infiltration and would later in his rule justify his control in the name of building his 
“New Society”. Under the new martial law provisions, the Philippine Broadcasting Service 
(PBS) was amalgamated into the Bureau of Broadcast Services and was turned into a mouthpiece 
of the Marcos regime. 
The regime established various national media oversight committees and councils in 
order to maintain complete authority over who had the license to publish and what type of 
information was being allowed into the public sphere. The Mass Media Council (initially known 
as the Committee on Mass Media) was established in October 1972 by Secretary of Information 
Francisco Tatad and Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, who would later lead the revolt 
against the Marcos regime in 1986. Under Presidential Decree No. 36, the council was officially 
established and given the authority to issue media operating licenses under the indirect 
supervision of Marcos.  
The Philippine government also attempted to influence the freedom of the press in the 
neighboring nations. A Philippine proposal drafted in 1978 suggested that any publication 
banned in a member nation of ASEAN should be automatically banned in other nations. While 
most of ASEAN members rejected the proposal outright, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia 
agreed in May 1980 to a cooperative news exchange program (Youngblood 1981: 715). Marcos 
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utilized his domination of the media to propagandize his authority and elevate his wife Imelda 
into the international spotlight. Imelda is most notoriously known for spending the Philippine 
economic profits on a prolific collection of shoes and accessories amidst national economic 
woes.  
Although Marcos called an end to martial law in 1981, the liberalization of the Philippine 
press was incremental. Marcos‟ opponents began to implement plans to publish a newspaper and 
establish a broadcast network. Marcos abolished the media councils to allow Filipino media 
industries to grow independently of government control. The Broadcast Media Council, 
however, announced that it was still the reigning broadcast authority in the Philippines 
(Youngblood 1987: 727). Although Marcos relaxed the restrictions, the regime maintained strict 
control over the dissemination of information to the public via institutional licensing boards and 
regulatory agencies. Intense centralization of the mass media accompanied the Marcos regime‟s 
stern grip on the Filipino society. Marcos‟ media became the source of his legitimacy, and state-
created propaganda and news were framed to the regime‟s liking. 
Marcos chose to liberalize the regime‟s stated policies in light of the popular unrest in the 
nation. The economic disparities that continued to plague the Philippines caused the population 
to coalesce against the Marcos government. Business elites joined peasants and deserters in the 
streets to force Marcos out of office. The cessation of martial law and the allowance of more 
liberalized media policies signaled to the Filipino population that the leader recognized the 
inevitable deterioration of the regime and led the population to more effective coordination under 
the opposition leaders led by Benigno Aquino. 
The ninth constitutional revision in January 1981, which accompanied the cessation of 
martial law, brought about changes to the constitution that solidified Marcos‟ rule. Marcos 
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eliminated the role of the vice-president within the executive branch and implemented a fifty 
year old minimum age requirement to run for the presidential office. This coincided with the 
return of his main competition, exiled senator Benigno Aquino. The symbolic election called by 
President Marcos in 1984 to demonstrate his willingness to participate in democratic institutions 
(predominately displayed for the international media) occasioned the first coordinated, public 
demonstration by democratic coalitions opposing the reelection of Marcos.  
The communist-organized National Democratic Front mobilized support from students, 
the middle class and human rights groups. The Catholic clergy along with leftists and democrats 
joined together to boycott the 1984 election. Although the peaceful boycott of the election 
underscored the people‟s increasing weariness of the Marcos‟ regime, when Marcos won 
reelection with 62 percent of the vote, the democratic opposition was rendered ineffective and 
the protest polarized Filipino society further (Overholt 1986).  
  By the mid-1980s, it was clear that the Marcos‟ authoritarian reform government had 
become an oppressive dictatorship that was hostile toward national development and did not 
benefit the nation directly. A series of bad economic decisions, predominately the selling off of 
Philippine industrial sectors to Marcos‟ friends and family, alienated the Filipino business 
community due to the failing national economy. In the fall of 1982, United States‟ banks began 
to warn the Philippine Central Bank that immediate rescheduling of funds was required to avoid 
an economic crisis. The official reserves declined by $1.4 billion between December 1982 and 
July 1983 (Overholt 1986). The Philippine financial crisis of 1983 established the slippery slope 
toward revolution. Yet it was the blatant and broadcasted assassination of beloved Senator 
Benigno Aquino upon setting foot inside the nation that transformed social indignation into 
political action. 
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President Marcos viewed the return of Senator Aquino from exile as a threat to his power. 
Aquino had actively spoken against the anti-democratic Marcos regime. In an editorial that was 
written days before his departure to the Philippines and published in the New York Times on 
Tuesday, August 25, 1983, Aquino emphasized the necessity for democracy in the Philippines: 
“the battle being fought in the Philippines is between those who have been mesmerized by the 
„efficiency‟ of authoritarianism and those who still hold that democracy with all its flaws and 
inefficiency is man‟s best hope for betterment and progress” (Aquino 1983: A23). Aquino 
understood that Marcos‟ attempts to preserve his authority tainted the prospects of democracy 
emerging organically.  
The Marcos regime explained away the death of Aquino by using the rogue communist 
attack justification. The alleged murderer was killed by the government within moments of the 
assassination. However, the regime was never able give a detailed description of the murder 
creating suspicions about its involvement in the murder while igniting a revolt against the 
Marcos administration. The funeral procession for Aquino turned into a massive demonstration 
against Marcos and a show of support for the mother of government-accused murderer Rolando 
Galman.  
The Filipino public refused to believe the Marcos‟ tale of the Aquino assassination which 
became evident in multiple mass demonstrations that took place afterward, most notably the 
funeral procession for Aquino in November 1983, where “about 10,000 people, carrying banners 
identifying themselves with 14 organizations of doctors, dentists, lawyers and other professional 
groups, marched through the Makati financial district” (Trumbull 1983: 5). The Aquino funeral 
turned into one of the largest anti-government demonstrations allowed by the Marcos 
government since the declaration of martial law. 
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During a Reagan-sanctioned visit in October 1985, Senator Paul Laxalt, (R-Nevada) 
warned Marcos that the domestic and economic health of the Philippines were in jeopardy and 
the president himself was out of touch with the Filipino society (Keller 1985). Marcos prepared 
for the election that would end his empire, in order to appease the disenchanted Reagan 
administration that was busily fighting communist and authoritarian regimes worldwide. While 
Marcos manipulated the mass media in attempt to steal the election, the element of interest in the 
1986 Filipino election is the manner in which the broadcast media was utilized by the opposition 
to organize the People‟s Power Revolution. The citizens were mobilized via information 
communication technology in the form of broadcast radio that was organized by the democratic 
opposition and disseminated nationwide.  
The Revolution and the Role of ‘Radio Veritas’ 
 
 Anti-Marcos sentiment in the 1980s swelled with the deterioration of the national 
economy and his unrelenting will to hold onto authority. The opposition forces became an 
amalgamation of normally dissenting coalitions who generally opposed the Marcos brand of 
governance. The stealing of the election on February 7, 1986 ignited a three-day revolt that 
deposed the Marcos administration. The socio-economic events leading up to the election were 
clear indicators that the results would be transformative. The entrance of Corazon Aquino into 
the presidential election gave voice to the opposition forces and introduced their catalyst for 
change.  
 The February 7th election occurred with predictable violence and fraudulent results; 
“according to the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), at least 3.3 million 
people were systematically kept from exercising their right to vote,  91 people were killed in 
election day violence” (Villegas 1987: 195). On February 15, Marcos announced himself as the 
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winner of the election, provoking a storm of dissent among the populace. Most notably, the 
Catholic Bishops‟ Conference of the Philippines initiated an organizational campaign of the 
citizens using the Catholic-owned and operated Radio Veritas to reach the masses. The next day, 
Corazon Aquino held a protest rally in Rizal Park in Manila and with nearly a million in 
attendance she called upon the people to organize on February 25 against Marcos‟ stolen 
election. (NYT 1986: A12). 
The People‟s Power Revolution officially began on the evening of February 22, 1986, 
with the resignation of the Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and Deputy Chief of Staff of 
the Armed Forces Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos and their collective call for Marcos to turn 
over the rightful powers of the presidency to Aquino. Radio Veritas and Aquino challenged the 
Filipino people to support and mobilize in defense of the rebels, which included units of military 
fighting the Marcos regime. Cardinal Jamie Sin, operator of Radio Veritas encouraged the people 
to support the Ramos-Enrile coup and emphasized that the people chose “peaceful change” in the 
February 7 election (NYT 1986: A12).  
President Marcos declared a state of emergency on February 24, ordering a national 
curfew. Marcos, recognizing the power of the broadcast radio, ordered the closing of all radio 
stations. The military was instructed to take necessary precautions to impede the revolution. 
Contrary to Marcos‟ unenforced orders, however, Radio Veritas continued to transmit opposition 
messages encouraging the people to stand strong in the streets against Marcos‟ attempts to break-
up demonstrations. Veritas was sabotaged and temporarily put out of operation for the evening of 
February 24, in the heat of the revolution, but was returned to power shortly after the attack. The 
Filipino people mobilized on the streets of Manila in protest of continued Marcos rule (NYT 
1986: A12).  
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The revolution percolated over the course of three days. Finally on February 25, 1986, 
both Corazon Aquino and President Marcos scheduled their respective inaugurations while 
thousands of rebel Filipinos defied Marcos‟ curfew and continued to surround the captured 
defense ministry. Aquino was inaugurated along with her running mate Salvador Laurel and 
immediately appointed the regime opponents Enrile and Ramos back to their positions held 
under the Marcos regime. Although the Marcos inauguration continued as scheduled, television 
coverage of the event was interrupted, symbolizing the abrupt end to the regime.  
After days of continued battle with the rebel Filipinos in the streets and the crumbling of 
his military, Marcos with the aid of former Senator Laxalt was given sanctuary by the U.S. and 
relocated to Honolulu. The “Laxalt Doctrine” initiated a new procedure in American 
international relations in which authoritarian leaders are given asylum from the often violent 
deposing of their administration (Bolton 2000). The Filipino oppositional forces, with the 
organization offered by Radio Veritas, swiftly defeated the illegitimate Marcos administration 
with minimal violence. Laxalt‟s international version of American diplomacy provided a 
deposed authoritarian leader with an excellent retirement package.  
The legacy of American political practices in the Philippines, such as press freedom, but 
most importantly the appearance of consistent elections had been relatively successful before the 
Marcos‟ „New Society‟ project. Until the election of Marcos, the nation held presidential 
elections every four years and its media institutions remained relatively autonomous of the 
government. These democratic liberties had allowed the Filipino people to recognize economic 
oppression and the deprivation of their rights which contributed to the demise of a dictator.  The 
preexisting Filipino constitution, while influenced heavily by the United States, after 
amendments offered by Marcos established self-interested prerequisites for becoming president 
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which led to the blatant stealing of the 1986 election amidst a failing economy. The self-
interested amending of the constitution was the catalyst the people needed.  
The use of the Catholic-owned Radio Veritas by Marcos‟ opposition allowed them to 
disseminate information about the Aquino assassination and to organize of the people in the 
streets of Manila. The Filipinos were able to reinforce the Enrile-Ramos takeover of the defense 
ministry and stop the movement of Marcos‟ militia throughout the capital city. The entirety of 
the Filipino society, including business, government and military elite, turned away from the 
Marcos administration and collectively mobilized to create a new democratic republic.  
 The unity observed in the People‟s Power Revolution is unmatched by the following case 
studies. In very few observable cases has a society coalesced around the common goal of not 
only ridding the nation of an authoritarian government that was fleecing the nation of its wealth 
but of crafting a more durable transition to a democratic regime that served elements of the 
population, not just some. The Filipino people were not subject to “the electoral fallacy” 
(Schmitter & Karl 1991) or the urgency of now which plagues many revolutionary movements. 
The Filipinos had a plan of action for deposing a dictator, reinstituting a democratic form of 
government, and had institutionalizing their newly founded democracy.  
It is arguably because the medium (Vertias) the opposition used to mobilize the 
population was transcendent among all the Filipino classes and involved every sect (cleavage) of 
the society that the people were successful not only in eliminating Marcos from power, but 
establishing a form of government which was conducive to the long-term goals of the opposition 
movement for governance. However, the Chinese case provides an excellent pre-information 
revolution example of the perpetuation of the Marxist interpretation of class/identity-based social 
movements. While Marx argues that mobilization of the classes against existing power could be 
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successful in defeating tyranny, the events at Tiananmen Square are a clear example of how 
more than one class must rise against the powers that be, in order to create a successful and 




 The 1989 revolution in Tiananmen Square, China included similar elements of societal 
repression and economic turmoil that had become institutionalized by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). The political organization of the Chinese academic elite and the mobilization of 
other contentious factions within society contributed to the international awareness of the protest 
that escalated into a harsh regime crackdown. The Chinese populace, mindful of the 40th 
anniversary of the People‟s Republic, was poised to celebrate and emphasize the importance of 
institutions within the society. Nevertheless, the student-mobilized rebellion at Tiananmen 
Square failed to engage the entirety of the Chinese population. 
 The Chinese political and economic balance had actually shifted in 1984 with The 
Resolution of the Economic System Reform by the Central Committee (Dittmer 1990). The 
resolution mandated a substantial restructuring of the economy, from planned to market, without 
providing the safety nets necessary to sustain the massive population during the ensuing 
inflationary period. The CCP resolved that price reform would be necessary to establish market 
„discipline‟ and in 1985 the CCP decided to “decontrol the price of the means of production” 
(Shi 1990: 1190). 
 The reformation of the Chinese price code initiated a wave of activity among prominent 
political families to establish intermediary firms through which producers would sell products 
well below the market price. The firm would resell those products in the open market, a practice 
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known as “official profiteering” (Shi 1990; Deng 1997). The shifting balance between power and 
money created a new class of Chinese political leaders. These “third echelon cadres” reflected 
the corruption in the Chinese political society that entitled the first-generation of every Politburo 
member to have at least one offspring promoted to the bureau-chief level of bureaucracy (Shi 
1990). This blatant and procedural corruption aggravated the populace and led to small-scale 
student protesting to pressure the government to address its grievances (Dittmer 1990).  
Chinese Communist Party Secretary Hu Yaobang offered proposals calling for the 
punishment of profiteers, which included many family members of party leaders. Conservative 
Chinese officials along with economic reform leaders feared that Hu‟s proposals would become 
effective and imprison their family members that participated in profiteering. These forces came 
together politically to dismiss Hu in 1987 for failing to stop student demonstrations against the 
third echelon. 
 Economic dissatisfaction was exacerbated in the latter part of 1988 when the reform 
coalition leader Zhao Ziyang came into power and attempted to deregulate retail prices, setting 
off an “inflationary binge” and precipitating a wave of financial panic among the population 
(Dittmer 1990: 26). The distribution of wealth among social classes was altered due to the 
reforms. Peasants had been oppressed in society, and when reforms were instituted the pattern of 
distribution had shifted and they became less affected by inflation. Factory owners and managers 
were able under the new reforms to reinvest their profits within their own establishment and 
workers were offered high incentives to increase productivity (Shi 1990).  
 For the economically privileged social classes, intellectuals and government workers, 
living standards dropped considerably under the high inflation. Intellectuals lacked employment 
opportunities, while government employees also had to live on shrinking wages due to inflation. 
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Those officials who were able opted to employ their political power to produce additional 
sources of wealth. Directly following the institution of economic reforms that severely cut the 
living standard of the intellectual class was a 1988 State Educational Committee initiative that 
left students responsible for their own post-graduate job assignments, which previously had been 
a duty of the state.  
The student job assignment was established by the Chinese government to control 
students‟ activities and behaviors through a basic carrot and stick method. Those students who 
did well and did not cause trouble for the government would receive preferred job assignments 
while „bad‟ students often were given village assignments (Shi 1990). The students, who were 
now free to organize and protest against the government without fear of retaliation through job 
assignments, became concerned that only the children of prominent families would receive 
quality job opportunities.  
 The CCP under the leadership of Mao adopted a policy of “redemption to seduce 
intellectuals into cooperating with the regime” (Shi 1990: 1193). Under the redemption policy, 
the Chinese government employed academics at high salaries in order to contain and control 
their knowledge.  As the economic circumstances of the intellectual class worsened, their 
opposition to the government grew. The government assault on the intellectuals‟ privileges 
became the catalyst of the 1989 revolution.   
The Student Revolution 
 
 The events that led to the massacre in Tiananmen Square began on April 15, 1989, with 
the death of the beloved student-sympathizer and former Party Secretary Hu Yaobang. His death 
caused the newly energized students to violate rules against demonstration and memorializing 
mandates. Pictures of the dead leader were displayed in Tiananmen, which was strictly 
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prohibited by the CCP. The student revolution was made official on April 22, 1989, when the 
new regime under Zhao Ziyang prohibited hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens from 
entering Tiananmen during Hu‟s memorial service in the Great Hall of People (Shi 1990). 
Thousands of the Chinese students held a sit-in over the night of April 21 and remained in the 
Square to protest the ban on their freedom. Finally, on April 24, the students announced a strike 
of classes for an “indefinite duration and the establishment of a national students‟ federation 
preparatory committee” (Dittmer 1990: 32).  
 The students placed demands upon the CCP establishment that seemed to shake the party 
to its core. First and most threatening to the government was the demand to permit the students 
to form their own organizations independently from the CCP, yet still be fully recognized by the 
government (Shi 1990). This was a contentious idea for CCP leaders who had held strict control 
over student organizations. The students also demanded that the government lift the ban on the 
news media to allow a free flow of information instead of the regular government-sanctioned 
coverage. 
 Since the founding of the People‟s Republic in 1949, the Chinese government has held 
tight control over its media institutions, restricting the flow of accurate information to its people 
and eliminating its people‟s right to form associations, resulting in the elimination of vocal 
expression of opposition toward the government. According to the official CCP doctrine, “the 
news media is an instrument of the state and its function is to mobilize people to carry out the 
regime‟s agenda” (Shi 1990: 1195). The CCP controlled the flow and content of information 
modes to prevent any outside interests or other party affiliations from spreading oppositional 
ideas amongst the Chinese people. This restriction on the amount of information readily 
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available to the citizens prevented the student movement from gaining the support of the entire 
Chinese community. 
 The Chinese press existed in a bifurcated state: the party-censored media and the non-
party alternative media that distributed information independently (and illegally) to the 
population. The party-established media existed solely to legitimize the role of the CCP in 
society and subsequently, the menagerie of non-party dominated publications that were licensed 
to produce their own “specialized” papers, equating them to an alternative Chinese media outlet 
(Akhavan-Majid 2004: 557). Authorization to accept advertisements was given to the media in 
1979. The policy was intended to emphasize the power of the media as the primary means of 
state communication with the masses and stimulate modernization (Lynch 1999).  
The significant result of the CCP domination of the press was the creation and rapid 
diffusion of the various non-party newspapers to provide the alternative information that citizens 
were not able to receive via mainstream Chinese press outlets. There was an obvious drop in 
readership; between 1980 and 1996, the circulation of the People’s Daily, the CCP‟s favored 
publication, dropped from eight million to two million readers (Huang 2001: 446). The state-
controlled and censored media acted as the propaganda machine which disenchanted many of the 
Chinese people, in particular the student organizations during the build-up to Tiananmen. The 
unfettered flow of information in Chinese society was squelched by the CCP‟s necessity to 
organize and filter popular knowledge of government activities that might have provoked 
opposition. 
The students made no effort to include the peasant-laboring class, which was outside of 
the student communication network (student newspapers, informational meetings held on 
campuses, campus radio stations). Peasants and workers were reluctant to protest a government 
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that was actually allowing them to live a sustainable life. Student organized groups such as the 
Beijing University Student Association and the Dialogue Delegation mobilized students at their 
respective institutions, organizing meetings, setting agendas and supervising print and broadcast 
information technologies. Throughout the duration of the movement, however, they too narrowly 
focused their fight within the realm of academia (Guthrie 1995).  
The various and intense acts of political theatre in the Beijing streets were the most direct 
dialogue the students had with the masses. The direct engagement and deliberate action involved 
with political protest theatre stirred on-lookers to join the mass movement in the streets. In lieu 
of traditional outlets (newspapers, magazines, radio/television stations) reporting on the build-up 
and massacre at Tiananmen Square, the students used the tool of mobilization in the streets to 
engage other sectors of the population. According to Esherick and Wasserstorm, political theatre 
or the theatrical display of culturally powerful symbolic messages, became the important 
mechanism of mass communication and mobilization in the Chinese movement of 1989 
(Esherick & Wasserstorm 1992).  
 The government‟s perception of the student revolution evolved through three phases over 
the course of three months. Suppression was the first mode of the Chinese government (which in 
Zhao‟s absence was led by conservative „hardliners‟ of the CCP, the most vocal being Deng 
Xiaoping). The government believed that the student revolution was just that, involving only 
students and that the great majority of workers and farmers were on the side of the regime. On 
April 26, an editorial published in the People’s Daily expressed the sentiments of Deng Xiaoping 
and the CCP warning that “a very small number of people who crave nothing short of nationwide 
chaos are trying to stir up trouble on the spot or behind the scenes” (Shi, 1990: 1197). Deng then 
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ordered over 20,000 soldiers to Beijing, sending the message that extended student protests 
would be punished to the highest degree.  
 Deciding not to heed the call of Deng to halt the protests, the students organized the 
largest demonstration against the government in PRC history on April 27, 1989; an estimated 
100,000 students marched for 17 hours in the streets of Beijing, breaking through police and 
military barriers. The protesters were clear in their intentions not to blatantly oppose the 
government and call for the overthrow of the CCP but to show overall support for the basic 
tenets of communism. Slogans and posters showing support for their government such as 
“Support Socialism and support the Communist Party” were ubiquitous, showing the government 
that the students were not out for a regime transformation (Shi 1990: 1197).  
The Chinese officials were overwhelmed at the size of the demonstration and had 
deployed insufficient unarmed troops to handle the protests in the streets. While the government 
did not immediately crackdown against the student protest, it also did not make any immediate 
political concessions to the protesters. This ended the first phase of Tiananmen events. Students 
perceived the threat of government retaliation for their protests as unlikely, while the government 
viewed the actions of the citizens as an empty protest which was evident as it deployed unarmed 
troops to resolve the protests. The inaction by the Chinese government led the students to 
overestimate their political power, encouraged by the government‟s allowing of the media to 
cover the student movement in early May. The students viewed this as a victorious concession.  
The second escalation of the student movement began in mid-May. After the media 
concession and the return of Zhao, the students changed the course of their protest by employing 
peaceful methods, such as the massive hunger strike that began on May 13, in order to pressure 
the government to respond to their main demand - their right to organize associations that were 
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grounded in free speech and freedom of expression. The CCP concern was palpable at this stage 
in the game. The Gorbachev summit that was scheduled to encourage cooperation between the 
two nations began on May 15, 1989, and threatened to steal international press coverage away 
from the student protest yet ended up emphasizing the Chinese domestic conflict to the 
international community. It was during the summit that the CCP decided to take a stand against 
the protest. On May 19 martial law was officially declared in a public meeting in which 
Secretary General Zhao failed to show up and was formally stripped of his political power by the 
CCP leadership because of the concessions he had made to the student movement (Dittmer 
1990).  
However, the expulsion of Zhao did not slow the movement. On May 20, when troops 
headed to the square to disengage the protests, they were stopped by a massive outpouring of 
citizens with an estimated two million people filling the streets of Beijing (Dittmer 1990). For 
the next two weeks, the students dominated the Square, and while throughout the duration of the 
sit-in their numbers dwindled, they maintained enough dissenters to cause the government to 
hold off on violent persecution. Yet again the students warded off a showdown with the CCP due 
to the unwillingness of the Chinese government to use violence against its citizens, particularly 
under the watch of the entire international community, which was facilitated by Gorbachev‟s 
visit. The students made no political gains during this second round of protests. The government 
refused to recognize or hold dialogue with any student associations, setting up the finality of the 
Tiananmen Square revolution.  
The student revolution came to a violent end on the night of June 3, 1989; the new 
leadership under Deng Xiaoping sanctioned the use of violent attacks to suppress and finally stop 
the protest and infiltration of Tiananmen Square. The CCP had at least two reasons for utilizing 
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force to end the three month long student-mobilized saga: the ineffectiveness of the declaration 
of martial law to dissuade protesters and the need to enforce respect for the existing power 
structure (Dittmer 1990; Shi 1990; Deng 1997). The concentrated military effort in Tiananmen 
Square caused approximately 1000 deaths, mostly of citizens who attempted to block the military 
advancement. The number of arrested revolutionaries “exceeded 2500 in early July, but 
unofficial estimates put it at over 10,000; the official list of executions at last count was around 
26” (Dittmer 1990: 34).  
The Chinese Media: Keeping the State in Control 
 
 The Chinese media have been an institutionalized pillar of the state since the 
establishment of the People‟s Republic in 1949. The press existed as a direct outlet of state-
sponsored propaganda in the Mao era that used the Chinese media to impose a top-down flow of 
information to the masses and lead them toward acceptance of socialist policies. Thus the media 
was not allowed to report on inner turmoil or the politics behind the socialist advancement; the 
press was sanctioned to report favorably on the agenda of the Communist Party (Berlin 1993). 
The most relaxed media control in history directly preceded the events at Tiananmen Square 
when Deng Xiaoping relaxed media controls in 1982 to allow the internal media wider reporting 
opportunities. This relaxation of media restrictions resulted in an advertising boom and cries for 
journalism laws that would protect freedom of the press (MacKinnon 1997).  
 The CCP‟s adoption of liberalized media policies did not have a lasting effect on the 
nation socially. China eventually became one of the world‟s technological leaders in terms of 
new innovation and research design in the latter years of the information revolution once the 
economic sector was allowed to flourish. The national policy of cultural and social indoctrination 
imposed via the top-down flow of news and policy attitudes controlled information access in 
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Chinese society. As a result, the research and development sector of the economy was isolated 
from the similar international programs of the time because of restrictive Chinese social policy 
attitudes. Chinese leaders recognized the stagnant economic climate and barriers to innovation 
brought upon by the Cultural Revolution. In reaction, they began to implement policies that 
fostered scientific development.  
The "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Reform 
of the Science and Technology Management System," released in 1985, loosened up the Chinese 
research and development sector. The 863 strategic research program was established in 1986 
and focused on the nation‟s biotechnology, nanotechnology, information, and automation 
technology. China embraced information technology development while simultaneously 
depriving its citizens the freedom to use the innovations (DiCapua 1998). The resulting 
international relations term „Chinese democracy‟ summarized a situation in which a regime 
adopted liberalizing policies that had a positive impact on economic/business development 
without affecting the political arrangements. 
 The Chinese investment in research and development technology sector began indirectly, 
in 1978 with the government‟s decision to open its market to global technologies and new 
innovations. Foreign imports coming in at the time were running on satellite technology and 
fiber optics while the Chinese technologies were running on low-speed analog. This open policy, 
combined with the nation‟s underperforming research and development sector of the economy, 
led many multinational corporations to court China in hopes of partnering with the nation to 
develop its high-tech industry while capitalizing on new innovations that were to come from its 
students (DiCapua 1998). Imports to China improved significantly with the introduction of the 
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„open policy;‟ machinery and other technological imports increased eightfold from $2 billion 
(U.S.) in 1978 to over $16 billion by 1989 (Ho 1997: 85).  
 Yet the boost in technological imports to China did not soften the CCP‟s strict control of 
the citizens‟ access to new innovations or increased information. The CCP kept a state monopoly 
on the broadcast media outlets in China with the introduction of economic reforms in 1978. The 
government also revived Beijing Television, whose regular broadcasting rights had been 
suspended in 1967 due to the “Cultural Revolution” which embraced a “make revolution – stop 
working” mentality and led to an essential shutdown of the national infrastructure (Miller 2003: 
360). The CCP introduced a new national television network, China Central Television (CCTV) 
which quickly became the voice of the nation. CCTV acted as the state-controlled news media, 
reporting on events deemed newsworthy by the CCP. This effectively limited the public‟s 
information and knowledge about their government, including potential revolutions and policies 
that would be adverse to the government‟s interest. The ownership of televisions improved 
dramatically after the lift in media control; in 1978 every 100 urban families had only 0.59 color 
set. The number increased a hundredfold during the 1980s (Cooper et. al 1989). 
 The Chinese have adopted a unique policy of information cooperatives that adhere to and 
are extensions of the Central Party‟s authority. As in the case of China Central Television, the 
state maintained control over the broadcast radio station of Central People‟s Radio as well as the 
newspaper, the People‟s Daily, which is the daily publication distributed amongst the population. 
Although the regime offered and implemented a liberalized media policy, the CCP maintained 
control over which information was allowed to become public knowledge.  The students that 
would peaceably demonstrate against certain government policies (careful to respect the 
regime‟s right to exist and affirming their consent to still be governed, albeit with minor tweaks) 
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were given a major advantage when Chinese journalists were allowed to cover the doomed 
revolution. However, not even local media coverage was to sufficient to mobilize other sectors of 
the population around the students‟ plight and their demands for increased liberalization in 
society. The Chinese demonstrations relied upon state-censored media institutions that advocated 
the regime‟s agenda, and in so doing fostered unwillingness on the part of the business and 
working classes to join in the student revolution (DiCapua 1998). 
Mobilized Movement Failure 
 
The student-initiated mobilization at Tiananmen Square was a highly sophisticated and 
well-operated movement. However, the students failed to read many of the political attitudes of 
the government and certainly failed in their engagement of the entirety of the Chinese society. 
While the students‟ demands for increased democratic institutions and an end to economic 
policies that benefitted narrow elites were shared by other social classes within Chinese society, 
no other social classes were in such dire economic circumstances to make them willing to fight 
for any political changes to the status quo. The students made use of available communication 
outlets, the student radio, university newspapers and concentrated meetings on campuses around 
the nation. The chosen forums of public awareness hampered the students‟ ability to send a broad 
message to the masses. Instead, they engaged in a form of elitist protesting, mobilizing only the 
students and academics who were most harmed by the CCP‟s policy changes.  
The acts of „political theater‟ did engage many ordinary Chinese citizens. Unfortunately 
for the students, however, there was never a clearly defined engagement of labor unions or 
peasant groups. Although the demands of the students would have increased the rights for other 
social groups as well, the weakest point of the student revolution was its clear overestimation of 
its political power after the return of soft-liner Zhao, who conceded the relative freedom of the 
59 | P a g e  
 
press demand. This was the turning point that led to the students‟ demise, believing that if they 
fought harder and put more pressure on the CCP they would emerge victorious with all their 
agenda intact. However, the hunger strike maneuver only angered and embarrassed the CCP 
while it hosted Gorbachev. This delay and stalling of the movement led the new class in politics 
to persuade the government hardliners to dispose of Zhao and use more violent methods to end 
the protests.  
Once the CCP decided to engage in violence to undermine and dissolve the movement 
there were not enough protesters to put up a fight against the military onslaught. This is where 
the failure to adequately mobilize the masses doomed the student movement (Shi 1990; Dittmer 
1990; Guthrie 1995; Deng 1997). Because the students did not organize a more democratically 
inclusive movement, the government read and understood that the majority of the populace did 
not stand with the students and eventually the government used this knowledge to its advantage. 
 
Comment on a Similar Revolution 
 
Although the 1979 Iran Revolution was a decade before the student mobilization at 
Tiananmen Square, the opposition leader, (Khomeini) utilized the available technologies of the 
time to coordinate an effective revolution that resulted in the desired regime change. Khomeini 
employed cassette tapes to disseminate his accusations of the existing regime‟s devotion to 
westernization and secularism in his exiled state. While the Iranian Revolution was certainly not 
a democratizing movement, its political actors were able to effectively organize the population 
from the rural areas of the nation, tactics which have now generated broad support for 
Ahmadinejad in the urban centers of the nation against the western conformity advocated by 
Shah Reza. There were many innovations that could have been used to move the student‟s 
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message outside of the „ivory tower‟ realm of communication in the efforts at Tiananmen 
Square. However, the Chinese population was widely ignored in organizational efforts until acts 
of political theatre engaged them indirectly. The actions of the student activists did not 
necessarily establish support for the cause, but only a dynamic of actors caught up in a semi-
revolutionary moment.  
Although the Iranian government never established a clear monopoly on the state‟s 
media, there was an obvious bias toward the establishment, causing public information to be 
skewed. Religious opposition became the prominent mobilizing organization in the revolution; 
when in 1977 the press published a series of „open letters to the Shah‟ that questioned his 
governing practices, this was a test of what the Shah was willing to permit. Aside from the 
occasional risqué article denouncing the Shah, the citizens relied primarily upon the traditional 
modes of communication/information transfer, as exemplified in mosques and bazaars, to 
express their opposition to the Shah‟s anti-traditionalist agenda.  
Khomeini began to publicize his dissent against the government from exile first in Iraq 
and then in Paris, utilizing a large network of revolutionaries who were predominately students 
distributing speeches on audiocassette tapes. The cassettes on which Khomeini called for the 
removal of the Shah “became the main form of revolutionary communication between the 
revolutionary religious leadership outside of Iran and the growing religious opposition 
movement inside the country” (Al-Marashi 2004). It was the underground, opposition media that 
mobilized and galvanized the movement that ultimately ousted the monarch on February 11th, 
1979. The ideology and message of Khomeini was disseminated in audiocassettes, leaflets, ad-
hoc alternative media outlets and radical displays of graffiti along the walls of the community. 
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These media tactics became the catalyst for the mass revolution, playing a central role in 
building popular support for radical change in Iranian political life. 
The use of the available media technologies and outlets in the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
led to the successful ousting of the deeply unpopular Shah and an equally unpopular monarchy. 
The flow of information, in combination with the need for traditional insulation of religious and 
social norms within the nation against the Shah‟s reforms, empowered the citizens in a 
revolution that reinvented the nation as an Islamic republic. The type of information technologies 
available to mobilize the Iranian citizens against the Shah required a much more intense level of 
social interaction than the technologies utilized in the 1989 revolution. It required the community 
of opposition groups to interact with the citizens to solidify the protest.  
Although many revolutionary theories stress the importance of elite support in successful 
movements, the events in China at Tiananmen Square are a clear example of the necessity of 
organizing the working and peasant classes. With broad support, as seen in the People‟s Power 
Revolution where the business class joined the poor in the streets to oust the Marcos regime, acts 
of revolution have been able to achieve political goals. 
 
Effects of Pre-Information Revolution Mobilization 
 
Among the differences between the People‟s Power Revolution and Tiananmen Square 
uprising, the critical variable was the level of inclusiveness with the respect to the significant 
sectors of society. The People‟s Power Revolution was markedly more inclusive than the student 
revolution at Tiananmen Square. The entirety of the Filipino population had been exposed to 
Marcos‟ failed economic policies, and at the final stages of the People‟s Power Revolution the 
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entire Filipino community, including members of Marcos‟ own government and military, had 
joined the movement. 
 The declaration of martial law in Filipino society and the shift toward economic policies 
that solely benefitted Marcos‟ cronies, led the nation to mandate democratic change with the 
election of Corazon Aquino in 1987. The utilization of Radio Veritas to organize all of the 
Filipino citizens undoubtedly aided the movement and brought citizen activists to the streets. The 
governmental institutions in the Philippines were relatively more democratic than in China; 
citizens were able to organize and engage in marches, including the funeral procession for 
Aquino.  
  The CCP foundation in Chinese politics was institutionalized and revered by the 
Chinese people; this much was evident in the student revolution, which aimed not to replace the 
regime, but to alter the way it governed. Because the students did not have a clear majority 
consensus on the demands they placed upon the government, it was not necessary for the 
establishment to take them seriously. The students neglected the majority of Chinese society, and 
this was the major weakness of the Tiananmen revolution. The ICTs that were utilized by the 
Chinese students only reached other university students and those living in the urban areas of 
Beijing. They failed to engage rural peasants, farmers and the working class, which are the 
groups that typically play significant roles in successful revolutions.  The elitist structure of the 
Tiananmen Square movement for increased democracy embodied an internal contradiction. By 
excluding major portions of the populace, the students failed to grasp the democratic ideals for 
which they were protesting.   
Arguably, the successful and inclusive use of communication technology in the 
Philippines led to the mobilization of the entire population. However, the dissatisfaction with the 
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Marcos government was widespread, while in Tiananmen Square only a select and socially 
distinct group of the population opposed (and were affected by) new government policies. 
Seemingly, one necessary condition for a successful pre-information revolution protest is the 
inclusive mobilization of the populace and its grievances.  
The quasi-American democratic foundation within the Philippines assisted the People‟s 
Power Revolution because the citizens were acclimated to a certain degree of freedom and civil 
liberties. The CCP stringently governed the People‟s Republic of China since its establishment in 
1949. Citizens were controlled by various policies that prevented them from organizing against 
the government or forming private associations. Political mobilization in China was confined to 
universities and student organizations which produced an intellectual revolution that fizzled out 
due to the lack of inclusivity. The information revolution that followed the case studies just 
explored has expanded the available technologies and the political opportunity structure for 
global citizens to effectively coordinate protests against their government.  
The rise of globalization and the emergence of ICTs have allowed global citizens to 
connect and engage in revolutionary movements in more efficient ways. New technologies 
accompanied with internet (and wireless) capability have created publics everywhere that have 
the potential to be more aware, educated and politically transformative. In the following sections 
of this thesis, I will explore revolutions initiated in the information age and discuss the impact of 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Post-Information Revolution Case Studies 
 
 The rise of „PC-ism‟ (affordable personal computer ownership) became an international 
movement in the 1980s with the introduction of the IBM PC (Model 5150) in August 1981 
followed by the Apple Macintosh in 1984, which was the first mouse-driven computer. Early 
models of the personal computer spanning from the mid-1960s were devoid of user-compatible 
systems and were produced for technical and professional uses and cost up to $10,000 (Allan 
2001). The diffusion of personal computers and the networking innovations that followed led to 
the blossoming of globalization and the global market economy (Friedman 2000; Castells 2001; 
2005; Gimmler 2001; Cairncross 1997). The introduction and diffusion of internet capabilities in 
1994 instituted a new global medium and eventually a standard of communication, cooperation 
and coordination beyond their local control. The citizens of the international community openly 
embraced the intertwining innovations that have accompanied globalization. This would 
logically occur when a regime understands the importance of adopting information technologies 
in governance and educating the populace in their use. The introduction of the network society 
has emphasized the porosity of the traditional boundaries and facilitated new world institutions 
that engage global citizens via internet and mobile ICTs.  
 In terms of revolutionary theory, the information age transformed the terms and 
conditions of civic engagement. Problems that were once dealt with at the national level now 
have transnational significance. Issues of autonomy, civil and human rights, energy consumption 
and the environment have become hot-topic international concerns and have initiated a spirit of 
humanitarian involvement. The colored revolutions in the Soviet bloc nations and the increased 
anti-globalization protests became internationalized local issues as the Western media 
consistently reported on the grassroots movements for democracy. In nations like Moldova 
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(2008), Georgia (2003) and Kyrgyzstan (2005, 2010), political actors have embraced new 
internet technologies, like Twitter, to mobilize scattered populations (predominantly in capital 
cities) for a democratic goal. Contemporary revolutionary movements and their leaders 
understand that “the internet has become of the most important new tools for activists involved 
in non-violent resistance – they use it to promote their message, to network and organize 
clandestinely, and to evade censorship and communicate with the world situations where the 
government controls the media or shuts down alternative outlets” (Wasley 2007: 52).  
 Similar to the Philippines, the Orange Revolution was a lesson in revolutions or 
transitions achieved in the backdrop of significant elections which “are more often symptoms of 
the problems of hybrid and authoritarian regimes, rather than solutions to their ills” (Kalandadze 
& Orenstein 2009: 1404). This ideal is known as the “electoral fallacy,” (Schmitter & Karl 1991) 
and while electoral revolutions may be successful in causing a certain degree of democratic 
change within a nation, the revolutionary aspects and demands of the citizens are extremely 
narrow and do not address the foundational grievances in national governance (Schmitter & Karl 
1991). While there may be some democratic changes permitted to appease the dissenting 
populace in the electoral process, instant or at least relatively quick gratification via the election 
mechanism is typically not enough to force overwhelming and lasting democratization. This 
deficiency could explain the recent digression in governance back to a more conservative 
Russian-backed administration in the 2009 Ukrainian election.  
According to Samuel Huntington,  globalization has brought on an international „third 
wave‟ as the increased availability of information to citizens has encouraged a wave of 
democratization at least in certain institutions; “thanks in large part to the impact of global 
communications, by the mid-1980s the image of a „worldwide democratic revolution‟ 
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undoubtedly became a reality” (Huntington 1991: 102). The democratic ideals emphasize the 
freedom and rights of the individual, which is intensified by the availability of mobile 
technologies that have become synonymous with instant revolutions/movements. The post-
information revolution protests in this study have incorporated the international media, and in the 
successful case utilized new internet technologies to mobilize support for their cause. As Cottle 
(2008) has noted, “it is in and through the news media especially that the politics of protest and 
dissent is now generally conveyed to wider audiences, and it is by this same means that wider 
support and legitimacy for their actions and aims can be potentially won or lost” (854).  
 
The Orange Revolution: Another Electoral Demand for Democracy 
 
 The history of the Ukraine has been entwined with Russia ever since its 18th century 
absorption into the Russian Empire. Even following its eventual independence with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Ukraine adhered to the tenets of state 
authoritarianism and continued a legacy of oppression. The trajectory of events leading to the 
2004 Orange Revolution originated with the people‟s continued oppression and rampant 
corruption inflicted by their government. Due to its fractionalized national identity and relative 
newness, modern Ukrainian political history has been marked by the pull between pro-Western 
democratic candidates and the safety of the status quo. The Ukraine nation existed as a pseudo-
democracy, amalgamating the basic tenets of the Soviet-style communism that governed prior to 
independence with superficially democratic institutions, particularly by adhering to economic 
theories that promoted privatization. 
 The era of the non-violent revolution began in the late-1980s with the Velvet Revolution 
on the streets of Prague in the spirit of democratizing preexisting institutions. Arguably, the new 
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wave of democratization/globalization coincided with the rise in non-violent revolutionary 
tactics. The efficacy of the movement was enhanced by new technological innovations. Adoption 
and effective application of new information communication technologies have essentially 
reduced the need for citizen actors to engage in violence in order to create change in political 
revolutions. Ideological demonstrations are highly organized and mobilization is voluntarily 
inclusive, allowing more pockets of potential opposition to join the movement. According to 
Kaufmann (2005), “over the last 30 years, the stereotype of mass uprising has radically 
changed….much more common now are hordes of unarmed people, often young, filling the 
streets to voice their hopes and wishes to their countrymen, their leaders and perhaps most 
importantly, to the world watching on television” (6).  
Ukrainian Politics: The Fragmented Build-Up to Orange 
 
 The deeply interconnected (and in recent years, hostile) Ukrainian-Soviet/Russian 
relations played a major part in the discontent among the Ukrainian population that came to a 
head with the Orange Revolution. The Ukraine is divided between the southern and eastern 
regions that made up parts of Imperial Russia, and remain pro-Russian. While western and 
central Ukraine were less influenced by Russian thought. The traditions and Ukrainian state 
institutions, particularly under Kuchma, who was the second president of the Ukraine from 1994 
through 2005, continued the nation‟s adherence to post-Soviet ideals of governance and use of 
the media to propagandize. The establishment of a fractionalized civil society was emphasized in 
the media‟s portrayal of national politics, which was predominately Kuchma-filtered for negative 
content to be removed from circulation.  This constant censorship of the media and government 
activities led to a deepening of the distrust amongst Ukrainian citizens toward their semi-
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authoritarian government. While the nation legally independent, the executive officials of the 
state remained loyal to traditions of their mother country. 
The political landscape in Ukraine began to shift in the early 21st century, with the 
ousting of then Prime Minister Yushchenko and his cronies from within the Kuchma 
administration in April 2001 (Aslund & McFaul 2006). The „Ukraine Without Kuchma‟ 
movement was already in progress, but gained momentum with the dismissal of Yushchenko and 
the emergence of popular opposition groups. In response to the abrupt Kuchma reorganization of 
the executive cabinet, opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko (who would become prime minister 
and then 2010 presidential candidate) organized a broad political coalition that joined her „Front 
for National Salvation,‟ the Socialist party and Yushchenko‟s newly formed „Our Ukraine.‟ 
While the coalitions did relatively well in the 2002 parliamentary elections, with „Our Ukraine‟ 
receiving nearly 33% of the vote, the ruling elite under the leadership of Kuchma maintained its 
majority in the national parliament.  
Yet the relative success of the opposition blocs in the parliamentary election encouraged 
the formation of a more solid coalition behind a presidential candidate in 2004. The Socialists 
were unwilling to back Yushchenko, thus opting out of the coalition while „Our Ukraine‟ and 
„Front for National Salvation‟ united to form the political collective that included the main 
opposition groups mobilized in the Orange Revolution (Aslund & McFaul 2006). President 
Kuchma had a vested interest in seeing Viktor Yanukovych, a hand-picked ally, win the 
presidential election; with a pro-Russian status quo replacement, Kuchma was guaranteed de 
facto immunity from investigation into his corrupt regime.  
Former President Kuchma was implicated in the multiple disappearances of journalists, 
while the privatization of media outlets to gain wealth and influence in the form of the 
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censorship had become public knowledge late in his second term. Kuchma, who was elected 
president in 1994, after serving as the nation‟s prime minister, replaced the pro-Western Leonid 
Kravchuk and immediately implemented sweeping policy changes that increased Russian 
influence in state politics/economics. Although he was the prime motivator in drafting a post-
Soviet rule constitution in 1996, “Kuchma‟s record in promoting democracy was mediocre at 
best” (Klobucar et al. 2002: 315). As was the case in the Philippines, the attempt to steal the 
presidential election became the main catalyst for mobilized activism. The citizens of the 
Ukraine had become restive under the Kuchma regime‟s corruption and its filtering of public 
knowledge. The presidential election of 2004 offered the people new hope for democratic 
change.  
The Ukrainian Media: Journalism in a Vacuum 
 
The Ukrainian media existed in tension between government-regulated outlets and 
peripheral entities. With the declaration of independence, the state ended its formal censorship of 
the mass media and, in 1992, the Ukrainian parliament passed legislation that legalized private 
ownership of the media. The privatization of the Ukrainian media allowed for new information 
outlets to legally operate within the nation. Along with the privatization came liberalization, and 
greater global integration (Dyczok 2006). The „new media‟ and its accompanying information 
communication technologies, cable, satellite television and most notably, the internet, changed 
not only the demographic of the news-watching population but also increased the availability of 
news information throughout the citizenry. Censorship resurged in the latter 1990s, with the 
deepening of the media oligarchy and the Kuchma state manipulating the content of news in 
order to legitimize his authority and cover indiscretions. 
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Availability of internet technologies in the Ukraine increased rapidly, particularly after 
the 2000 Gongadze case, in which journalist Heorhii Gongadze disappeared (and was eventually 
ruled as murdered) for opposing incumbent Kuchma‟s re-election campaign in the press (Dyczok 
2006; Korduban 2009). Opposition activists began to coalesce in 2000-01 with the establishment 
of the „Ukraine Without Kuchma‟ movement which predominately was composed of anti-
establishment journalists and activists. The intensifying of dissenting activist coalitions seems in 
hindsight to have foreshadowed the 2004 demonstration. The opposition movement was 
triggered by the public‟s belief that the regime played a role in the disappearance of Gongadze 
and other prominent anti-Kuchma media figures. Ukrainian internet usage increased from 3.8 
million people in 2003 to 5.9 million people in December 2004, in the midst of the Orange 
Revolution when youth opposition groups used a website named Maidan to post information and 
documents from disenchanted government officials (Dyczok 2006; Wasley 2007).  
Although private, the Ukrainian press had been restricted for much of the Kuchma 
administration, remaining in control of elite oligarchs that viewed the media as an instrument of 
power. Under the Kuchma regime, the National Television and Broadcasting Council of Ukraine 
which issues broadcast licenses began to apply pressure to opposition applicants. Under this 
strategy, “the state retained ownership of approximately 10% of television and radio stations and 
newspapers at the national, regional and local levels” (Dyczok 2006: 221).  In an interview 
conducted in 2003, Iryna Pohorelova, editor and founder of the website Telekrytyka made this 
statement about the state of the Ukrainian media: “there is an absence of information in the mass 
media. Now the mass media is a shield which covers and does not give information out. Ukraine 
is experiencing an information deficit – this is why the internet is flourishing – it provides a 
source of information” (Dyczok 2006: 224).  
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The restriction on Ukrainian journalists and the content of information available to the 
citizens arguably played a considerable role in encouraging the Orange Revolution, yet it also 
emphasized the division between the pro-State media and the „opposition‟ that accounted for 
everyone else. While alternative media outlets were allowed to exist under the semi-authoritarian 
Kuchma regime, their presence merely allowed the ruling elites to deny that censorship occurred. 
The Ukrainian media and its politically factionalized government had a difficult time deciphering 
whose side they were on; “With political alliances being forged and broken and new ones being 
forged again, it is often difficult for the media to work out if it is for or against the government, 
especially with two of the original groups within the Orange Revolution composing both the 
government and elements of the opposition” (Foley 2006: 14). 
The Color of Revolution 
 
 The revolution began on November 21, 2004, with the fraudulent presidential election 
when both Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych declared themselves the 
victor, while the Central Electoral Commission validated an alleged Yanukovych victory the 
next day.  The international community, and in particular election monitors worldwide, 
condemned the Ukrainian election as not adhering to democratic standards. The Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Parliament, the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Council of Europe published a “preliminary report declaring that the election 
did not meet democratic standards” (Chivers 2005: A1).  
The first rally against the impending Yanukovych presidency took place in Kiev‟s 
Independence Square on November 22, where hundreds of thousands demonstrators came to 
oppose the stolen election. The findings of the international election commission included the 
abuse of state resources by the flagrant registration of millions of new voters on election day that 
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shifted voters in favor of the prime minister. According to one newspaper report, “the pressure 
on students to vote for the state‟s choice, widespread abuse of absentee voters, including reports 
of voters being bused from region to region and overt bias of the state-financed news media” all 
put the legitimacy of a Yanukovych victory in question (Chivers 2005: A11). 
 Although the Ukrainian Supreme Court halted the publishing of the election results on 
November 25 to investigate the claims of election-tampering, the Ukrainian media entities that 
were Kuchma-backed reported a Yanukovych victory, while Yushchenko supporters took to the 
streets (Chivers 2005: A1). On November 27, the democratic movement became a revolution; 
the Parliament declared the vote invalid and adopted a “symbolic, non-binding vote of no-
confidence in the electoral commission” (BBC News 2005). An estimated 700,000 Yushchenko 
supporters swarmed Independence Square and surrounded the Parliament building as their 
president demanded a new election. Another revolutionary victory occurred on December 1, 
when the Ukrainian Parliament passed a no-confidence vote on Prime Minister Yanukovych and 
his cabinet, effectively ousting him from government. Simultaneously, Yushchenko gave 
directions to his 400,000 plus supporters to “remain in the streets” for the tenth night and 
condemned the use of force or violence. Yushchenko also called for cessation of the obstruction 
of government buildings (Kiev City Guide 2010).  
 The Ukrainian citizens received the belated gift of democracy on December 26, when the 
third round of presidential voting proceeded with more than 12,000 election observers who were 
registered to monitor the race for quality. The Ukrainian Committee of Voters, which had issued 
an initial, comprehensive report on the corruption during the first rounds of the presidential 
election, commissioned 10,000 monitors for the final round. The committee released a statement 
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late on election night, stating that it had not “documented the kinds of „massive falsifications‟ 
seen in the first two rounds of voting” (Chivers 2005: A1).  
Nearly all the votes were counted on December 27 and the election committee declared 
that Yushchenko‟s lead was considerable and Yanukovych could not catch him in the polls. 
While Yanukovych attempted to appeal to the Ukrainian Supreme Court with complaints of 
electoral fraud, the court dismissed all four claims and the Central Election Commission rejected 
his appeal of the overall vote on December 30. The following day, Mr. Yanukovych resigned 
from his prime minister position, citing an unwillingness to work with Yushchenko loyalists and 
finally, on January 11, 2005, the Ukrainian Electoral Commission declared Mr. Yushchenko the 
official winner of the second presidential election with 51.99% of the vote (BBC News 2005).  
On January 23, 2005, Viktor Yushchenko was sworn in as the new Ukrainian President 
solidifying the colored „people‟s power‟ revolution for democracy and justice. The election of 
Yushchenko was more than a victory for the supporters of the orange revolution. The movement 
was proclaimed “a triumph for all Ukrainians, who showed they were capable of using their own 
institutions to correct the voting fraud that marred the earlier election” (NYT 2004: A20). The 11-
day encampment on the streets of Kiev by hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians was an 
international scene for democratization that elicited support from the Western world. Michael 
McFaul stated that “the Orange Revolution may have been the first in history to be largely 
organized online” (McFaul & Aslund 2005: 16).  
The citizens used Maidan, a website that was established on December 20, 2000, in the 
midst of the „Ukraine Without Kuchma‟ movement, to become an online pro-democracy activist 
group. Maidan provided a virtual forum in which citizen activists could exchange information 
and organize protests. The main activity of Maidan was election monitoring and networking with 
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other pro-democracy organizations around Eastern Europe (Goldstein 2007: 14). The Ukrainian 
opposition used the information and the efficiency of online message boards to mobilize the 
population against the Kuchma corruption in effort to stimulate democratic change. Another 
major grassroots movement that utilized ICTs to spread democratic ideals around Ukraine was 
PORA (It‟s Time). PORA (Black Pora!) is a volunteer organization and a political party (Yellow 
Pora!) composed predominately of students and youth that coordinated non-violent advocacy of 
increased democracy.  
 A report issued by PORA in 2005 asserted that Kuchma‟s campaign existed “under the 
conditions of far-reaching censorship and absence of independent media, the main idea of PORA 
was the creation of alternative „mass media‟” (PORA 2005). By October 2004, Pora had joined 
the Yushchenko campaign and assisted the pro-democracy movement by organizing public 
protests and student strikes. The Ukrainian government vacillated between support of media 
outlets that provided sanctioned information to citizens and applying a more restrictive media 
policy to impede online political mobilization. The anti-Kuchma/pro-Yushchenko citizens and 
opposition activists effectively used the latest emerging technologies (mobile phone, wireless 
internet and network online societies) to engage and successfully demand democratic 
institutional changes via massive demonstrations. While new technologies do not always 
stimulate mass citizen involvement, the fragmented political climate in the Ukraine, combined 
with intense desire to correct the flawed elections and establish a less authoritarian government, 
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Saffron: Revolutionary Failure in the New Era 
 
The diffusion of ICTs has been uneven across the world. As discussed in previous 
sections the presence of a „digital divide‟ continues to impede the progress of certain regions. 
South Asian countries in particular have been slow to adapt to the contemporary ICTs. There are 
obvious socioeconomic reasons for this. Education and economic development levels in many of 
the South Asian countries (Nepal, Bhutan, India, and Myanmar) have been retarded by 
colonialization and imperialism in their recent histories. The South East Asian or „tiger 
economies‟ have encouraged economic development by harnessing the potential offered in new 
information technologies and have started to emphasize the importance of „knowledge-based 
economies,‟ yet “the countries of South Asia have been drastically left behind, with the 
exception of parts of India” (Akhtar & Gregson 2000: 9).  
Burma has been living in an era of stalled development with the continuation of the 
longest active civil war in the world. The nation which was a British possession between 1824 
and 1886 has a factious population that has been at odds for over sixty years. The 1974 
Constitution identifies seven ethnic states – Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, 
Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan, along with various other prominent minority groups in the region, 
plus Chinese, Tamils, Bengalis and Indians (Brooten 2006). Upon the declaration of 
independence in 1948, civil war broke out in Burma between ethnic minorities and the Burmese 
government. The nation was governed under civilian rule until the military coup in 1962, which 
exacerbated dissension among the people.  
The establishment of a military junta led to a major outbreak of anti-government protests 
(initially student-orchestrated) in 1988 in which hundreds of thousands of Burmese civilians 
began an insurgency in the streets. The military regime responded to the 1988 protests with a 
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strategic counterinsurgency plan using the nation‟s land resources as leverage to halt the 
demonstrations. The military regime cleverly recognized that the “ethnic power has a major role 
to play in Burmese politics, so immediately it picked up the armed ethnic groups and spread out 
their power…..its leaders recognized that he who rules the ethnics, rules Burma” (Brooten 2006: 
356).  
The contemporary opposition groups in Burma are coalitions of differing ethnic 
minorities with weak ties among each other, yet with the shared democratic goal of autonomy for 
the ethnic nationalities and increased governance. The State Peace and Development Council, 
which is the military regime‟s legitimate face, has systematically restricted the civil rights and 
freedom of the Burmese people. The Council continues to perpetuate an environment of hostility. 
In late 2004, an estimated 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma alone, and 
at least 240 villages have been destroyed, relocated or abandoned since 2002 (Brooten 2006).  
The political environment in Burma as alluded to earlier, is highly contentious and 
violent; the socioeconomic development of the nation also comes into play when considering the 
Saffron Revolution of 2007. The colonial history, along with the militaristic uprising that ousted 
a civilian government and implanted the military junta that exists to this day, has contributed to 
intense discontent among the public. The crucial alliance within Saffron involves the peasant and 
clergy classes, which initiated the movement in the streets protesting the government‟s 
exorbitant tax increases on fuel subsidies that increased inflation on everyday consumables and 
commodities. When the military junta took power in 1962 it declared that the „Burmese Way to 
Socialism‟ would be the model of economic governance including the nationalization of the 
majority of the private industries along with tight government control over the Burmese trade 
sector (Head 2007).  
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The Burmese population has suffered at the hands of the junta. More than half of the 
annual budget goes to the military and Burma is also internationally sanctioned for the ongoing 
detention of democratic opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. This set of obstacles puts public 
policy goals like reducing poverty, out of reach (BBC News 2007). At the end of 2006, the cost 
of essentials drastically increased by 30-40% which added an additional economic burden on the 
Burmese people, who were barely sustaining themselves. When the Burmese government 
decided on August 15, 2007 to lift the subsidies on gasoline, its price rose by 500%. The price of 
diesel, which generates power for the entire nation, also doubled (Head 2007), setting off 
national outrage. The impact of the government‟s decision was significant. As gas prices 
increased, so did the price of food and other imports due to higher cost of transportation.  
Demonstrations began on August 19, 2007, and were immediately condemned by the 
government‟s newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar, where it was reported that the protesters 
caused “civil unrest aimed at undermining the peace and security of the State” (Kessler 2007). 
The U.S. government condemned the arrests of the Burmese protesters, calling on the military 
regime to free the dissenters and work to establish democratic institutions. In September 2007, 
the protests intensified, becoming more frequent and mobilizing more of the population against 
the government. On September 22, around 12,000 laymen and monks marched through Yangon 
and Mandalay, bringing new prominence to the movement swelling in Burma (BBC News 2007). 
The next day or eighth day of protest, around 150 nuns joined nearly 15,000 monks in the streets 
of Yangon and pledged to demonstrate until the junta was removed from power (BBC News 
2007). 
The government, after more than a week of dissolving small pockets of protests around 
the populated regions of the nation, finally moved decisively on September 24 after an estimated 
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50,000 to 100,000 people marched on the largest city, Rangoon. The military junta began its 
crackdown, placing armed soldiers and vehicles in the streets to contain the protests. On 
September 26, the government enforced a “dusk-to-dawn” curfew on Yangon and Mandalay, 
both hotbeds of political dissent (AFP 2007). The military police reacted violently to the mass 
demonstrations. Much like at Tiananmen, the government held off of a public display of force 
due to pressure from the international media and political community. However, once the 
government had had enough, it retaliated against its citizens, many of whom were revered 
members of the Buddhist monastery, in a manner that far surpasses the transgressions in China. 
The regime began by raiding monasteries across the nation, arresting and detaining monks in 
attempt to quell potential demonstrations. Reuters reported that 200 monks were arrested in 
Yangon in the first raid, and another 500 from the northeast were also detained (Reuters 2007).  
International media outlets such as the BBC, Al Jazeera and various Western/American 
organizations covered the massacre in Burma, mobilizing an intense wave of global supporters 
for the monks and laypeople. The United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session 
in October 2007 to address the worsening situation in Burma and adopted Resolution S-5/1: 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, in which the Council urged the government to “ensure 
full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and unhindered access to media 
information for the people” (U.N. Human Rights Council 2007).  
The government onslaught against the democratic opposition went on for over a month, 
and did not lead to any definitive resolution. Although the massive civilian protests drew 
international media attention, causing the government to eventually hold talks with the detained 
democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the demonstrations for peace and democracy 
dissipated without the monks and citizens accomplishing their goals for “lower commodity 
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prices, national reconciliation and immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all the political 
prisoners" (BBC News 2007).  
The Saffron Revolution was a modern-day peasant movement that was framed by the 
international media‟s coverage of the peaceful monks who attempted to create a more free 
society for the people of Burma. Mobilization efforts were absent within the nation, other than 
the constant coverage by the mainstream global media and re-publication on the internet; 
mobilization was achieved essentially by word of mouth, and the equality in oppression was 
expressed via protesting in the streets – each protest drew additional supporters. Thousands of 
Burmese citizens were arrested, beaten and killed in order to stop the demonstrations against the 
government. While journalists on the ground reported thousands dead, the U.N. Human Rights 
envoy to Burma, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, reported that the official death toll was merely thirty-
one. The New Light of Myanmar reported on October 11 that 2,100 people had been arrested and 
600 of those had been released, which is in stark contrast to the 6,000 people that the 
international media reported being arrested (Al Jazeera 2007). Even more ominous is the fact 
that the SPDC has failed to account for hundreds of citizens who have “disappeared” since the 
protests, leaving families unable to confirm if their missing relatives have been detained or killed 
(Human Rights Watch 2007). 
The Burmese Media: On the Borderline 
 
The Burmese media is obviously highly restricted due to the military regime that governs 
the country. There are regulatory entities established in Myanmar that control the dissemination 
of information and what is kept from the public. The Press Scrutiny and Registration Board 
(PSRB) is under the control of the Ministry of Information. The PSRB manipulates and applies 
censorship standards to the Burmese media, as cited in the Printers and Publishers Registration 
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Law of 1962 (Nordahl 2009). However, the borderland between Thailand and Burma provides a 
semi-autonomous region for opposition journalists, where alternative publications such as 
Irrawaddy and New Era Journal have evaded government censorship and could therefore 
flourish and be distributed (Callahan 1998).  These alternative publications followed the goals 
and agenda of various ethnic groups in Burma and addressed international issues that pertained 
to the nation. Some publications also focused narrowly upon individual ethnic minority news. 
Political scholars have argued that the Burmese nation was born out of a “series of military 
actions aimed at restricting dissent and emphasizing unity, defined as uniformity or unanimity,” 
and that even during the „democratic age‟ of civilian governance which occurred after the 1988 
citizen uprising that resulted in the resignation of General Ne Win (the first junta leader) - the 
nation was engrossed in violence (Callahan 1998; Nordahl 2009).  
The Burmese people rose from under British rule only to be co-opted by a violent, 
oppressive military junta that has restricted their freedoms and any opposition that may be 
directed towards the government. The independent media has recently started emphasizing the 
importance of „independence‟ over „unity,‟ but when publishing groups like the KNG (Kachin 
News Group), under the umbrella of KIO (Kachin Independence Organization), began to report 
on the power struggles among the opposition and the military junta, they were forced to flee. 
This is a typical reaction regarding unsanctioned information in repressive regimes. The 
Burmese government has connections within both the alternative media and state media to halt 
the dissemination of inconvenient information. The junta restricted connections to unfiltered 
information because it was unwilling to compromise its authority; “without cooperation we 
cannot distribute the paper inside Burma…so if we are working very independently, which we 
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can do, because we are in Thailand, we cannot reach the people inside Burma” (Brooten 2006: 
364). 
 With financing aid from the Norwegian government the opposition established a 
shortwave radio station in 1992, the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), and began to report on 
the daily activities of the democratic activists, emphasizing the importance of inclusivity in 
information distribution. The DVB had a relative independence due to the fact that its editorial 
board that consisted of members of the displaced democratic government (civilian) operated just 
outside of the country in Thailand (Brooten 2006; Nordahl 2009). The DVB maintained its duty 
to present the Burmese people with democratic opposition and cover events that were going 
unreported in the mainstream government media. The DVB acted as a “mediator between the 
various peoples in Burma and the leadership” and a dispenser of crucial information (Brooten 
2006: 367).  
 The Burmese activists utilized the internet to publicize to audiences within and outside of 
their nation the government‟s violent reaction to their peaceful protests for democracy. The 
protesters used digital photography, wireless internet access and online forums to engage the 
international community in their cause. The citizens, particularly the youth, have found pathways 
around the governmental obstacles in order to gain unhampered internet access. Authoritarian 
regimes that block and filter the available content on the internet are now being outsmarted by 
“bloggers [who] are teaching others to use foreign-hosted proxy sites – such as your-freedom.net 
to view blocked sites and tip-toe virtually unseen through cyberspace” encouraging protests and 
spreading ideology (Holmes 2007). Burma, in 2005, had only two state-controlled internet 
providers that filtered political websites and only 0.56% of the population had access to internet 
capabilities (Myanmar Posts and Telecom/Myanmar Teleport). The Myanmar Teleport is the 
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“infrastructure arm of Myanmar‟s internet system and is the entity responsible for blocking 
content” (OpenNet Initiative 2005). 
The regime became lax in supervising the internet activities of its citizens online after the 
former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was ousted in October 2004 in a power struggle, leaving the 
state‟s internet usage more open. Ian Brown, Oxford research fellow in internet privacy stated 
that “the Burmese government has a very repressive filtering regime…but it can be a bit 
inconsistent – one of the service providers blocks only international sites, the other only regional 
ones” (Holmes 2007). Yet the government still had heavy restrictions on the utilization of the 
internet and technologies by citizens. For example, any person failing to register a computer with 
a state-approved internet provider could face up to fifteen years in prison. Various international 
campaigns for democracy in Burma, and support for the protesters, littered online social forums 
and even took on celebrity status with Western actors such as Angelina Jolie commenting on the 
human rights abuses. Campaigns like Burma Campaign UK, the U.S. Campaign for Burma, and 
the Facebook group Burma Global Action Network brought international publicity to the plight 
of the monks and citizens. 
The Burma Global Action Network, which at its peak had 440,000 members, organized a 
„Global Day of Action for Burma‟ on October 6, 2007. Major cities around the world (San 
Diego, Paris, and Sydney, New York) held public demonstrations urging their governments to 
declare support for the people of Burma (Human Rights Watch 2007). Although most nations 
expressed deep concern and support for the protests and urged the Burmese government toward 
democratic reforms, nations like China and India maintained their commitment to 
nonintervention (Grice, Buncombe & Usborne 2007). In fact, the Chinese government refused to 
place sanctions on the military junta in Burma after many Western nations, most notably the 
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United States, called for pressure. The Chinese government also vetoed a U.N. Security Council 
resolution in January 2007 that would have called for punishment for the generals directly 
involved in the human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2007). 
The propping up of the Burmese military junta by crucial allies in the region like China 
and India became the key to the Saffron Revolution‟s failure. The citizens and monks garnered 
the attention of the international community in their quest for democracy, yet the brutality of the 
regime, supported by regional authoritarian governments, nullified the demands for change. The 
junta allowed the citizens to protest the rise in commodity prices for days without obvious 
retaliation, but when the demonstrations escalated into a nationwide movement to oust the 
regime it became necessary to quell any further action. Among the conditional possibilities for 
coaxing the military out of power and inducing them to tolerate a transition toward democracy, 
“the longer term issues – and hopes – involve gradual change in the military‟s image of itself as 
the ultimate guardian of national interest. The success of transition may depend even more on 
whether some civilian, as well as military, leaders have the imagination, the courage and 
willingness to come to interim agreements on rules and neutral guarantees” (Schmitter & 
O‟Donnell 1986: 36). 
Information communication technology is limited in Myanmar due to a concentration of 
resources in the major cities equipped with internet cafes; the opposition leaders have been 
unsuccessful in effectively mobilizing the entirety of the population to overthrow the regime. An 
implication of modern technology is that rational actors are necessary in order to create the 
network of dissent and coordinate protest demonstrations; as of 2008 only 0.1% of the Burmese 
population (40,000 users) had access to internet technologies -- certainly not enough of the 
population to be mobilized to significant action (Internet World Stats 2010). The international 
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media played a large part in the mobilization of the Burmese population in the Saffron 
Revolution; it was the international media reporting from outside the nation and the usage of 
blogs and alternative access to the Burmese internet that coordinated support for the protesters, 
especially for the monks. The national media infrastructure is highly restrictive and inhibits the 
public from networking with each other and coalescing around policy goals besides those offered 
by the junta.  
The increased mobilization potential offered by the advancement of the internet 
technologies can only create successful revolutionary movements if the population has access to 
it. The presence of international support was helpful to say the least, but without a wide base of 
local opposition the movement against a violent junta was hampered. The intense pressure for 
the military junta to liberalize was coming from outside the nation. While there were massive 
organized protests in the streets of Burma, they were largely coordinated by religious leaders 
instead of the typical opposition leaders who leave the option of violence on the table. The 
demonstrations in Burma became an on-going battle between the violent state apparatus and the 
peaceably assembled opposition. 
The mobilization of the citizens occurred in the online network society as international 
media coverage of events encouraged the public awareness of Myanmar. Yet the willingness of 
the Burmese government to handle the anti-government protests by any means necessary, 
including the murders of thousands of people, particularly revered members of the religious 
community, was unforeseen. The demands for civil rights and economic stability were staved off 
by the sheer desire to survive the government crackdown, leaving the Burmese democratic 
opposition back in the shadows of society under military rule.  
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The Effects of ICTs on the Third Wave 
 
The post-information revolution case studies, the Orange and Saffron Revolutions, 
illustrate the vast differences in the efficacy of new ICTs. While in both movements the citizens 
made use of ICTs to pressure the powers that be to adopt democracy or at least some democratic 
ideals, the Orange Revolution was a clear movement of democratization. The internet provides a 
public forum for engaging citizens in their home nation, while also providing a space for global 
campaigns for humanitarian intervention and support. International campaigns have the ability to 
grow from minute pockets of dissent to media-dominating pleas for governments worldwide to 
„do the right thing,‟ whether in the form of humanitarian intervention or military/diplomatic 
action. The revolutions explored in the post-information revolution era were advantageous in 
their use of information technologies, particularly the underground internet exchange of 
information during the Saffron Revolution to mobilize global citizens. The differences between 
the Ukrainian movement and the Burmese are the obviously more flexible democratic tendencies 
of the people in the Ukraine; the people of the Ukraine had relatively more democratic 
institutions compared with the military junta which has existed in Burma for over three decades.  
However, the relevance of ICTs was more problematic in the Saffron Revolution, where 
despite the state-controlled media and the tight grip on the access to information, the citizens 
were still able to operate publications, maneuver the internet, and exchange pertinent ideology 
around the regime. Although the revolution in Burma did not have a definitive conclusion, it was 
an example of a democratizing grassroots movement that failed yet the majority of the 
population grasped of the importance of democratic values, most obviously, the freedom of the 
press. 
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While scholars would expect citizens in semi-Western democracies to mobilize their 
revolutions by engaging in ICTs, there is a logical association among regimes that censor and/or 
strictly control the flow of information in a nation and the use of internet technologies. The 
internet, “while certainly no panacea for continuing inequalities of strategic and symbolic power 
mobilized in and through the mass media, evidently contains a socially activated potential to 
unsettle and on occasion even disrupt the vertical flows of institutionally controlled „top-down‟ 
communication, by inserting a horizontal communicative network into the wider 
communications environment” (Cottle 2008: 859). While there was not a definite democratic 
revolution in Burma, the citizens embraced the tenets of a free press to disseminate accurate 
information about the junta‟s massacring of monks and peaceful protesters.  
The success of the Orange Revolution in 2004 in Ukraine was due to the availability of 
mobile communication technologies that could harness the internet. The Ukrainians exchanged 
information and documents via Maidan, the online social forum and message board. The mass 
mobilization and the political circumstances led to the successful establishment of a pro-Western 
democratic administration for the first time since independence. The Ukrainians took advantage 
of the politically contentious moment in the election of Yushchenko and the collective demand 
for a democratic election. The Orange Revolution was insulated by an international dynamic of 
democratization and allies willing to pressure Russia to halt interference in the politics of the 
Ukraine.  
The media institutions in the Ukraine were relatively free compared to those of Burma, 
and the people rationally assessed the government‟s non-willingness to respond in a violent 
manner. Although the Kuchma regime was guided by corruption, it was not a violent 
authoritarian regime, only one willing to prosper at the expense of its citizens‟ rights. The junta 
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in Burma willingly suppressed dissent using brutal and bloody means. The Burmese protesters 
did not have the international support in the form of military assistance, which was necessary due 
to the hostile response taken by the junta. The Ukrainian regime was more willing to bend to the 
demands of the citizens because of the inherent Western influence on its politics. More 
importantly, however, the mobilization of the democratic opposition greatly influenced the 
Supreme Court‟s decision to enforce a re-election in the interest of justice.  
The availability of increasingly more advanced technologies allowed the citizens of both 
post-information revolution case studies to harness their potential through increased awareness 
of their causes. The potential is significant for „new media‟ technologies to expand support 
networks throughout the international community, and thus intensify the pressure on illegitimate 
governments and lead to successful establishment of democratic institutions, especially when 
imposed from the bottom up. The availability of ICTs has increased the ability of citizens to 
influence not only the foundation of their own politics but to raise international awareness of 
their causes. New information technologies have the power to facilitate the free exchange of 
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CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion 
 
Revolutionary theories emphasize the importance of individual agents and whether the 
state matters, while neglecting the saliency of the public. Other theories instead focus entirely on 
the role of the public at the expense of the state‟s undeniable role in the creation of revolutionary 
moments (traditionally due to unfavorable state policy, attitude).  As the political landscape is an 
ever-changing aspect of every nation‟s existence, so the international community experiences 
ebbs and flows in its accepted theories and applied practices. The adoption of new information 
technologies has been no different. There are nations that are pre-disposed to use advanced ICTs 
to govern, compete in the current world market economy and grow into the knowledge-based 
economy of the future. ICTs have encouraged the spread of the dissemination, which is related to 
freedom of the press. These developments arguably increase the demand for liberalization of 
regime policy. Significantly, the internet has become a substitute for the press in nations that 
restrict and manipulate public information, especially where citizens are hungry for information 
and willing to search for it.  
Prior to the emergence of ICTs, news and information were disseminated by newspaper, 
wire, telephone and took hours (even days) to reach around the world. The media outlets were 
very much a part of the state-apparatus in the pre-information revolution era, and often were only 
allowed to report on the news that the regime saw „fit to print.‟ The availability of information 
was limited. Although outlets for information dissemination existed, they operated in a relatively 
restricted environment. In today‟s mobile, wireless environment, communicating breaking news 
internationally takes only an instant. The world is more interconnected than ever before, offering 
to disenfranchised citizens the opportunity to mobilize efforts to instill democratic institutions. 
According to Cottle, “today‟s media ecology, comprising different and overlapping media 
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formations, horizontal and vertical communication flows and new interactional capabilities, offer 
unprecedented opportunities for wider dissemination of political protest and dissent – from the 
local to the global” (2008: 855).  
Contemporary revolutions and campaigns for change encompass both state and citizen 
sovereignty issues. For example, the use of internet technology to mobilize a protest requires a 
substantial infrastructure to be in place. The state plays an important role in the establishment 
and advancement of multinational internet service providers within their borders. While there are 
alternative means by which citizens otherwise restricted from obtaining internet access might 
acquire service, the internet infrastructure must be a national adoption.  The institution of the 
media has evolved to give representation to the people who were once ignored in society through 
alternative outlets that do not involve the professional journalist‟s decree of worthiness. Issues 
that were once marginalized have come to occupy the forefront of national and international 
policy. This is due primarily to the general population‟s increased awareness.  
Globalization has forced an evolution in the mass media. Whereas institutions of the 
press once were integrated entities of the government, the transnational and the world system of 
mass media has emerged, creating a layer of freedom of information that can no longer be 
restricted by the government (Gunaratne 2002). While the government still has the authority to 
tax, impede and place massive obstacles in front of the freedom of information, citizens‟ access 
to information via the internet can no longer be effectively blocked due to numerous ways to 
„hack‟ around government and into the network.  
The assertion that I am making about contemporary revolutionary theory is actor-
centered. Technology on its own is inanimate. Without a rational political actor to effectively use 
the available innovations of the era/time, technology on its own cannot explain or constitute an 
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explanation of contemporary revolutionary movements. While Skocpol and various other 
historical comparativist scholars argue the merits of state-based revolutions, the modern 
revolution is actor-technology centered, and cannot have a modern actor without supposing the 
variety of modern communication technologies that accompany him/her. The technology used to 
disseminate information and mobilize revolutionary protests in the information age requires 
political actors to engage effectively, persuasively and inclusively in order to succeed in political 
regime transformation.  
The liberal assumption that accompanies the notion of freedom of the press emphasizes 
an autonomous and competitive media acting as an educator of society and as the institution for 
the exchange ideas and information without government interference or censorship. Of course, 
this assumption does not recognize the necessity for a population that is hungry for knowledge 
and that understands the need for and potential of information in bringing about change. The 
press has always acted as a catalyst for the public‟s dissent. At least in the West, major 
revolutions have occurred within a scope of media framing via the citizens involved that has 
mobilized sympathizers worldwide. 
 However, the new media is providing an invisible social network in which information, 
sympathy, documents, ideology and protest have the potential to be shared within seconds. 
Demonstrations can be held at a moment‟s notice on a variety of grievances. In both the 
Philippines and the Ukraine, the perceived technopolitical optimism shared by the protesting 
masses resulted in the successful completion of the revolutionary goal, even if it was only 
temporary in the case of the Ukraine. The successful cases (Ukraine, Philippines) involved a 
media environment that was less restrictive than the failed case studies (China, Myanmar) which 
allowed the people a certain amount of optimism, not only about the availability of new forms of 
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communication, but also their ability to coalesce around a common revolutionary goal via these 
new mediums of communication. In all four case studies here, the utilization of the media 
available at the time of revolution allowed the citizen activists to mobilize broad support for their 
causes, and, in the later case studies, organized international campaigns.  
 The state-controlled media infrastructure that was present in the Philippines and the 
Ukraine was lax compared to the institutions of China and Burma. The leaders in the Philippines, 
the Ukraine and even in Deng Xiaoping in China were willing to liberalize stated policy goals in 
order to avoid democratization. There was a prominent alternative media in both the Philippines 
and the Ukraine that allowed citizens to receive information that the government did not want 
covered. This was accomplished with little fear of retaliation, due to the political climate in both 
revolutionary circumstances. The electoral factor cannot go unnoticed in both the Ukraine and 
the Philippines; the successful revolutions not only employed the available ICTs to enhance their 
protests, but also took advantage of the intense climate of democratic change associated with 
elections to effect change.  
Adam Przeworski argued that the circumstances in which successful democratic 
movements occur do not have an effect on the prospects of long-lasting regime change; yet the 
„electoral fallacy‟ still remains intact. The politically intense circumstances of regime change 
within the Ukraine caused the public to coalesce around a temporary democratic goal instead of 
building the foundation for a permanent regime change which was evident in the 2009 
presidential election. Although the „electoral fallacy‟ remains a valid theory in the explanation of 
failed revolutions, Schmitter and O‟Donnell offer a slightly more contemporary thought that 
asserts the shorter and “more unexpected the transition from authoritarian rule, the greater the 
likelihood of popular upsurge and its producing a lasting impact on the regime transformation” 
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(Schmitter & O‟Donnell 1986: 52). The infrastructure of both successful revolutionary nations 
was foundationally more democratic than those of Burma and China respectively. The American 
occupation of the Philippines and the Westernized regions of the Ukraine assisted the citizens in 
demanding the rights they were entitled to, particularly the access to unfiltered information.  
While China and Burma, both arguably grounded in authoritarian histories, had little 
infrastructural or governmental capacity to establish democratic institutions amidst a citizen 
revolt, both of these unsuccessful revolutions were rooted in regimes that were completely 
unwilling to accommodate their citizens or to acknowledge the desire to make changes in 
governance. The citizens overestimated their chances of success. In the case of China, the 
students underestimated the brutal lengths to which the CCP would eventually go to end the 
protest with minimal international fallout. The mass media in the failing revolutions were 
considerably more restrictive, causing the citizens to rely on alternative media outlets for 
information about the events occurring in the respective nation. The Chinese case study is 
somewhat different from Burma; the Chinese revolution relied solely on university press outlets 
that reached only as far as the students who wanted to disseminate information. This deprived the 
revolution of wider public support. While the protest in Burma reached the global population due 
to the international media and the availability of technology to support the spread of ideology. 
The availability of new ICTs, while enhancing a group‟s ability to organize and mobilize 
citizens globally, does not necessarily lead to successful democratic revolutions. Yet emerging 
internet capabilities have emphasized democratic opposition‟s efficacy in disseminating ideas, 
information and documents that differ from the official information coming from governments. 
As ICTs become more advanced and portable, they are allowing citizens to share ideas and 
philosophy about government policies. Whether these tools are harnessed to their full potential to 
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create successful revolutionary environments is dependent upon the circumstance and the 
political actors, but the availability of information technologies and the internet offers increased 
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